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The proposed title: The Geopolitics of Gas Transportation of Modern Russia 
(Case Studies of Two Pipelines). 
 
Project’ outline: There is no doubt, that the access to natural resources provides 
additional advantages for the future country’ development. What is more, some group 
of resources (such as natural gas) is not resources like any others – it can be classified 
nowadays as a specific group, namely: the strategic ones. Consequently, a country 
which holds sufficient reserves of geostrategic resources and has a possibility to 
develop them can pretend to play an influential role in the geopolitical field. Gas 
prices, the trade conditions have become significantly influenced by political desires 
and aspirations and it seems that every country recognizes these rules of the 
geopolitical game. 
 
One of the arguments of the current work is the acknowledgment that Russia is 
playing such a role in Europe and doing all the possible to maintain this order in the 
future.  On the one hand, the country has the “predisposition” to it by the fact of its 
geographical location. According to the data available1, by the end of the year 2008, 
the largest share of the world natural gas resources belonged to the Russian Federation 
(23,4 % of total). Besides this, major trade movements by pipeline to Europe were 
from Russia. On the other hand, Russia is interested in the “return” to it the status of 
superpower, which was lost by the country after the disintegration of the USSR. In my 
opinion, the gas geopolitics in Europe is seen by the Russian Federation as the 
possibility to gain this status back through the system of pipelines, being almost 
monopolistic gas supplier in the region. So, Russia due to it geographical position and 
                                                 
1
 “BP Statistical Review of World Energy. June 2009”, British Petroleum Global, 11 Mar. 2010 
<http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/sta
tistical_energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2009_downloads/statistical_review_of_world_en
ergy_full_report_2009.pdf>. 
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its ambitious claims became an actor which impossible to ignore in the geopolitical 
game. 
Another one argument of the thesis to look at is the fact that Russian aspirations 
became in geopolitical opposition with interests of the European Union and the 
United States. Both the US and the EU for the different reasons seek to decline 
European dependency from the Russian gas. On the one hand, faced up with the 
irregularity of gas supply, the EU is trying to diversify gas streams. On the other hand, 
recognizing the importance of the Eurasian region in the geopolitics and declaring 
interest in a “free circulation of hydrocarbons”, America is trying to keep its current 
leading position by preventing Europe from the Russian “imperial” ambitions.  
 
It became clear, that Eurasia (as well as it part) is still the object of interest of a 
number of geopolitical actors. The main feature of the current situation that arms race 
has been replaced by ‘pipelines race”: issues of “rival” pipelines (“Nord Stream”, 
“South Stream” and “Nabucco”) will be analyzed as steps of gas geopolitics in the 
region. 
 
The supposed structure of the thesis: 
• Abstract 
• Contents 
• List of abbreviations 
• List of tables/figures 
• Introduction 
• Literature (source) review 
• Research methods 
• Theoretical considerations [the neorealist approach: issues of the defensive 
realism and the energy security] 
• Natural gas markets [description of the international, European, Russian gas 
markets, as well as gas markets of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan] 
• Competeting pipelines [issues concerning “Nord Stream”, “South Stream”, 
“Nabucco” projects] 
• Conclusion 
• Summary abstract 
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• Bibliography 
 
 
The intended methodology of the thesis: 
I am going to implement a combination of the following methods:   
Firstly, it is the case study method (accompanied with the event analysis) which will 
help with providing a wide range of information and the theoretical explanation 
concerning plans/aims of the pipelines construction; 
Secondly,  data analyzing method which is useful for evaluating of descriptive 
statistical data (about the natural gas reserves, its production, consumption etc) and 
for presenting additional points to the arguments of the thesis; 
Finally, it is the method of comparative analysis, which on the basis of the results 
received after the previous methods applying will help to produce a better perspective 
for the studied issues.  
 
Bibliography: 
In order to develop arguments of the thesis and provide the basis for the contemplated 
methods, I am going to use a number of literature sources, including newspapers, 
journals, websites, Government publications, and statistical data (collected by 
different agencies). The contemplated groups of resources are following: 
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President of Russia web – pages. http://eng.kremlin.ru/; 
South Stream. Europe’s Energy Security. http://www.south-stream.info/?L=1; 
The Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation web - pages. 
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/main_eng. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
          Energy issues are of growing interest in the modern world. Ever since the 
Industrial Revolution, energy and the need to secure its supply have been fundamental 
to any position of power in the world2. If we turn our eyes upon the last century, we 
will find out that the problem of energy security were burning questions during the 
World War II, when a number of states have suffered from the lack of energy 
resources. Later, the 1973 oil crisis and the Iran – Iraq War, on the one hand, have 
emphasized the growing energy dependence of Europe, and, on the other hand, 
become the crucial moments for including problems of energy security in agendas of 
individual European states3. Afterwards, the Persian Gulf War, the Iraq War, the Gas 
Disputes between the Russian Federation and Belarus and Ukraine have intensified 
the feeling that the current age can be recognized as the era of “hydrocarbon man”. 
The era, which is characterized by the strikingly opposite interests of energy owing 
and/or producing countries and energy consuming ones. Besides this, there is a 
distinct aspiration of some countries with sufficient energy reserves to use them as 
weapons in promoting state’s geopolitical interests. At the same time, despite the 
rising role of energy in influencing state’s national security, regime development, 
domestic and international politics, it is known4 that the professional journals in 
political science and international relations have not paid the sufficient attention to 
publishing research on these topics; themes, which have been examined in this 
respect, have been mostly devoted to research to the impact of oil. In contrast, this 
work will be devoted to the analysis of the relationship between politics and natural 
gas originated from the Russian Federation (the country, which is supposed to be one 
of the most influential actors on the energy source markets). 
                                                 
2
 James R. Schlesinger. “Foreword”. Energy and Security. Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy. Ed. 
Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwin (Washington, D. C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Baltimore; 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005) xiii. 
3
 Šarka Waisová. “Úvodem. Energetická Bezpečnost v Evropském Prostoru: Současný Stav a 
Střednědobě Perspektivy” [Introduction. Energy Security in the European Space: Contemporary 
Situation and Medium – Term Perspectives]. Evropská Energetická Bezpečnost [European Energy 
Security]. Ed. Šarka Waisová (Plzeň: Aleš Čeněk, 2008) 9. 
4
 Brenda Shaffer, Energy Politics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009) 18. 
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          While analyzing relationship between politics and energy it is important to 
notice that specific role of natural gas in influencing the politics. There are a few 
important characteristic features5 of natural gas. First of all, there is a direct link 
between gas producers and consumers, which is actively used for the producer’s state 
policy implementation. Secondly, it is the fact that natural gas in not a fungible 
commodity in comparison with oil. Taking into consideration the information that the 
former is the world’s fastest growing energy source, which (if current trend remain 
the same) will become the leading global energy source, it is logical to suppose that 
natural gas could be able to play much more significant role in politics in the nearest 
future.     
          The aim of the first part of this work is to analyze which principles and ideas 
have influenced the foreign and security policies of the Russian Federation, what is 
supposed to be the state’s national interests and security problems, how Russia sees 
itself in the world affairs and global energy supply, which steps the country is going 
to undertake in the future for its strategic interests promoting, and - what is more 
important in the framework of this study - which place will take energy resources 
(namely, natural gas) in the Russian geopolitical aspirations. In order to answer these 
questions, in the first chapter of the thesis I am planning to develop my hypothesis 
that the contemporary Russia understand the national power in its neo(realist) 
meaning (including sphere of energy sector) and that the state is going to exploit the 
link between energy resources possessions and its national security and foreign 
policy’ tasks in the future. 
           The goal of the second part of the thesis is to evaluate the reasonableness of the 
desire of the Russian authorities to use the dependency of other countries and/or 
regions from the Russian natural gas reserves for its strategy’s implementations. For 
this reason Chapter 2 will be dedicated to the analysis of the international natural gas 
markets, as well as to markets of the European Union and the Russian Federation. 
This situation will be examined on the base of the statistics concerning the volumes of 
proved natural gas reserves, amounts of natural gas produced, consumed, exported 
and imported. Here I would also like to notice, that even though trade movements of 
liquefied natural gas (hereafter, LNG) in the year 2008 were significant in volumes 
                                                 
5
 Shaffer, 10, 13. Throughout the extent of the current chapter and until the further notice I am quoting 
piece of information available at the monograph mentioned in this reference.  
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(587,26 billion cubic meters6) and it is expected that the world LNG demand will 
increase on 2,6 times in the year 2020 (in comparison with the data at the end 2005)7, 
in the framework of the current study will be analyzed the trade movements of gas by 
pipeline only. Additionally, taking into consideration the plan about the construction 
of the rival to the Russia Nabucco pipeline, natural gas markets of Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan8 (which are supposed to supply this pipeline with gas) will be analyzed. 
Furthermore, steps of the Russian Federation to reach long – term gas purchase 
agreements with Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan for creating the additional problems 
for Nabucco project realization and providing other advantages for Russia in the 
foreign policy implementation will be presented. As well as this, the investigation of 
the complicated contemporary gas relationships between the Russian Federation and 
the European Union and the forecast of their development in the future will be 
provided. 
          The primary object of the third chapter of the thesis is to examine how the 
Russian Federation is going to respond on the actual European fear to be dependent 
from natural gas disputes between Russia and transit – states and on the want of the 
European Union to diversify natural gas supply resources and their routes. In the 
framework of this part of the thesis case studies of the two new natural gas pipelines 
projects (Nord Stream and South Stream) promoted by Russia will be analyzed. 
Besides the basic projects’ characteristics I am planning to investigate and outline 
                                                 
6
 “BP Statistical Review of World Energy. June 2009”. British Petroleum Global, 10 May 2010 
<http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/sta
tistical_energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2009_downloads/statistical_review_of_world_en
ergy_full_report_2009.pdf>. 
7
 “The Outlook for Global Trade in Liquefied Natural Gas Projections to the Year 2020”, The 
California Energy Commission, 15 Aug. 2007, 10 May 2010 
<http://www.energy.ca.gov/2007publications/CEC-200-2007-017/CEC-200-2007-017.PDF>. 
8
 According to the information available about the Nabucco gas pipeline project (“Markets and Sources 
for Nabucco”, Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project, 05 May 2010 <http://www.nabucco-
pipeline.com/company/markets-sources-for-nabucco/markets-sources-for-nabucco.html>), natural gas 
from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (among other countries) are considered to be sources 
for this pipeline. Natural gas markets of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan I have chosen for the analysis 
mainly for two reasons. First of all, these countries should be located in the different, but close to 
Russia regions (in order to examine the relationships between these countries and the Russian 
Federation). Similarly, Azerbaijan was chosen as the country from the Caspian Sea region, 
Turkmenistan - from the Central Asian region. Secondly, while deciding between Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan (as countries, situated in the same region), I have tended to the former as the state with 
much more sufficient natural gas reserves and, consequently, the better possibility to compete with 
Russia in this respect (proved natural gas reserves at end 2008 in Turkmenistan constituted 7,94 trillion 
cubic metres, while in Kazakhstan – 1,82 trillion cubic meters only – data available at: “BP Statistical 
Review of World Energy. June 2009”. British Petroleum Global, 10 May 2010 
<http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/sta
tistical_energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2009_downloads/statistical_review_of_world_en
ergy_full_report_2009.pdf>). 
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declared and true geopolitics goals of the Russian Federation connected with the new 
pipelines’ construction. Moreover, in this chapter I will show the principles of 
“dividing” politics of Russia in this respect, namely: the relationship with which 
European states the Russian Federation is defining for itself as priority and the claims 
of which of them could be ignored to some extent. Additionally, I will analyze which 
economic and political risks associated with the dominant position of Russia on the 
European natural gas markets the European states are going to overcome and, 
correspondingly, which moves the Russian Federation is undertaken in order to 
promote its strategic interests. Finally, the possible development of event connected 
with the new natural gas pipeline construction will be examined.
Literature Review 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
          
In order to develop a theoretical and conceptual frameworks of my study, as 
well as to obtain answers to the research questions outlined in the introduction of the 
thesis I have chosen a number of resources, which can be grouped as primary and 
secondary ones. The primary sources include statistics, government documents, and 
results of research studies, proceedings of conference or meetings, and interviews 
with political leaders and other participants of events, important in the framework of 
the current study. The group of secondary sources consists of analysis, interpretations 
and reviews of sources defined as primary ones. 
         First of all, for providing a theoretical background to the thesis I am planning to 
explain why I consider realism and neorealism (structural realism) to be the prevalent 
conceptions in the contemporary international relations. Selected pieces of literature 
by the prominent researchers and authors of the (neo)realism theory (such as Hans J. 
Morgentau, Nicholas J. Spykman, Kenneth N. Waltz, Robert Jervis and John J. 
Mearsheimer) will help me to identify issues (which I believe to have the permanent 
and never – ending actuality), related to the problems of national interests promoting, 
state’ security, power politics and the views on the suitable amounts of power needed 
in order to ensure the state’ survival in conditions of international politics. In addition 
to this, for confirmation of my idea that the realistic and neorealistic principles have 
been reflected in the foreign and security policies of Russia, I am planning to pay 
attention to the analysis of the following laws in force, namely: “The Foreign Policy 
Concept of the Russian Federation” and “The Strategy of the National Security of the 
Russian Federation until the Year 2020”. Personally, I think that scrutiny of such 
documents is helpful in identifying state’s strategic priorities and interests, and 
instruments (means), which the state is going to use for the pursuing its policies. 
Besides this, the investigation of the Russian government publications mentioned 
above is irreplaceable for understanding, that the Russian Federation sees its energy 
resources possessions as the effective lever for the foreign policy promoting and as a 
tool for security goal implementation and, what is more, it was assigned and justified 
by law. 
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          Secondly, for the developing of the conceptual framework of the thesis, I am 
going with the help of statistical data to investigate the situation on the natural gas 
markets of the world, as well as of these of the European Union, Russia, 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan by the end of the year 2008. Additionally, I am 
planning to determine the level of dependency of the European Union’ countries from 
the natural gas export in the whole and from the Russian natural gas in particular. 
Similarly, the evaluation of the position of the Russian Federation on the global 
natural gas market and the forecast the possible development of the relationships 
between the Russian Federation on the one hand, and the European Union, and for 
another hand will be presented. In order to fulfill these tasks I am planning to use the 
data available from the statistical reviews provided by the number of sources: British 
Petroleum, the European Commission’s Directorate – General for Energy and 
Transport, Eni S. p. A. and many others. I realize that all the data can have some 
extent of reliability problem, at the same time, the information from the British 
Petroleum web page I am going to use in the overwhelming majority of cases. The 
first reason for choosing British Petroleum as the main statistical source is that it is 
widely recognized as the most authoritative and reliable. Another one reason to resort 
to the British Petroleum’ statistics (even in the description of the Russian natural gas 
market) is the necessity of data comparability. The fact that the Russian gas company 
Gazprom uses another one standard for the gas reserve size evaluating, which takes 
into account only the possibility of natural gas “presence” in deposits, while 
international standards evaluate also the economic effectiveness from the reserves’ 
extraction, makes impossible to compare data received from the different sources9.  
          Thirdly, analysis of opinions of Sandra Kalniete and Loyola de Palacio 
(politicians, who were engaged in work on energy issues on the European 
Commission’s agenda), review of official documents of the European Union and the 
Russian Federation (The Energy Strategy of Russia until 2020 and The 2006 Green 
Paper – A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy), 
accompanied with the results of researches provided by the analytics and experts of 
Europe’s and Inogate Energy Portals, RIA Novosti and other sources are helpful in 
the forecasting the future relationships between Russia and the European Union as a 
                                                 
9
 The difference between these two methods in gas reserves’ evaluation between the methods can be 
seen in the section “Reserves” at the Gazprom’s web page: “Gas Resources”, Gazprom, 05 May 2010 
<http://www.gazprom.com/production/reserves/>. 
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gas consumer and Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan as gas exporters and possible gas 
delivers to the rival Nabucco pipeline. 
          Afterwards, the next part of the thesis will be devoted to the investigation of 
objects, which Russia is pursuing or declaring to reach by the promoting of the Nord 
Stream and South Stream pipelines, which steps and actions have been already 
undertaken toward the attaining these goals and how the Russian gas geopolitics 
intensions are received and evaluated by the transit – states, member – states of the 
European Union and the United States. In order to draw a complete picture and 
benefit from the examination of arguments presented from owing – and/or producing 
– countries and consuming – countries perspectives, I am going to appeal not only to 
the official information available on the web pages of the President and Prime – 
Minister of the Russian Federation and companies, responsible for pipelines’ 
construction, but also to the actual reviews by the independent Russian and foreign 
media sources, such as Radiostantsija Echo Moskvy, The International Oil & Gas 
Newspaper, Interfax, RIA Novosti, The Economist, BBC News and others. I believe 
that such selection of sources will help to investigate the issues which deal with new 
gas pipeline construction from different points of view (the Russian – logically 
positive and western ones – understandably watchful) and provide the base for their 
critical evaluation.  Besides this, the monographs and review of a number of scholars 
and researcher (such as Brenda Shaffer, Edward Lucas, Gregory R. Copley) 
supplemented with materials of the studies by the Center for Strategic & International 
Studies, Länder – Analysen, Institute of International Relations and Political Science 
of Vilnius University, East European Gas Analysis will assist me in the realization of 
my aim, namely: to carry out facts – based and critical study of the geopolitics of gas 
transportation in contemporary Russia.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
          In order to research the chosen field of study, this work will make use of a 
combination of the following methods, namely: data analyzing method, method of 
comparative analysis and the case study method. In my point of view, these methods 
will be useful in identifying the key research issues, bringing together strands of 
argumentation, providing base for investigating ideas, evaluating the results of study, 
and, after all, they are indispensable for the making progress in a field.   
          To begin with the data analyzing method which is absolutely irreplaceable in 
discovering cause – and – effect relationships between the energy resources 
possessions (in our case – natural gas reserves) of different countries and/or group of 
countries and their place in the world global energy market. Answering to this 
purpose of the thesis, the analyzing data will be grouped so that to identify the 
situation on the international gas market, as well as on gas markets of the European 
Union, the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan (the reason for choosing this 
very regions has been already presented in the introduction to the thesis). First of all, 
each of the examined regions will be evaluated with the help of statistics presenting 
the volumes of proved natural gas reserves. Furthermore, the analysis will be 
supplemented by the indicators of amounts of natural gas produced and consumed and 
volumes and directions of exported and imported gas in order to determine the 
advantages and disadvantages of every single region in this respect. In addition to the 
data presented, a number of graphs and charts will be used in order to introduce the 
descriptive statistics in a visible, clear and understandable way. On balance, all the 
forms of data analysis which I am going to apply in the thesis will be implemented not 
only for the providing an overall picture of the world global energy market but also 
will be organized so that useful information can be extracted from it. 
          Similarly, the previous described method will present a sufficient base for the 
implementation of the method of comparative analysis. The comparison, correlation 
and contrast that will be made across the statistical data under analysis will help to 
evaluate the natural gas producing, importing and/or exporting potentials of the 
European Union, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation. Moreover, it 
Research Methodology 
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will show up clearly the reason for the visible role of Russia on the world energy 
market, to determine the extent of dependency of the European Union from natural 
gas import in the whole and from import of natural gas from the Russian Federation in 
particular (five groups of dependency will be presented). What is more, in my point of 
view, it will provide the additional (expressed in figures) grounds for understanding 
the reasonableness of the Russian authorities to use the dependence of European 
countries from the Russian natural gas for its foreign policy implementing and the 
strengthening its power. In order to make the analysis and subsequent conclusions 
more reliable and well – founded, I find logically to compare and summarize not only 
the statistics available at the end of the year 2008, but also the data for the period from 
1994 to 2008 in order to clarify tendencies and trends of national and/or regional 
natural gas markets’ development. 
           Additionally, in order to complete the empirical part of my thesis, the case 
study method (accompanied with the event analysis) will be used. I believe that this 
method will be indispensable for providing a wide range of information and analysis 
concerning the intention of the Russian Federation to put into practice the Nord 
Stream and the South Stream natural gas pipeline projects as consecutive steps of the 
Russian gas geopolitics in the European region. The method allows focusing on the 
basic project’s characteristics and, what is more important, on the preceding events, 
which “force” Russia to work out the issues of the pipeline constructions and on the 
declared and real aims, which the state is pursuing or pretending to reach. Moreover, 
this method is really useful in investigating the ways of project’s implementation and 
promoting, for analyzing the means of competition employed by Russia towards the 
rival project and states – competitors and understanding why the actions of Russia 
toward its goals remain successful (at least, at the time of the thesis’ writing) . Besides 
this, in the framework of the case study method I am planning to determine and 
forecast the possible development and consequences of the projects’ realization (for 
instance, how the plans of Russia will influence its relationships with the transit – 
countries, and some member – states of the European Union). 
          As limitations of the data analyzing method and method of comparative 
analysis I would like mention the fact that they are based (in the majority of cases) on 
the statistics from the only resource though very famous and respected: British 
Petroleum. The considerable degree of the subjectivism of conclusions provided can 
be assumed - to a certain extent - as the limitation of the case study method.
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CHAPTER 1. 
REALISM AND NEOREALISM AS THE GUIDANCE IN THE 
MODERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. 
 
 
          My main research questions will be presented in the chapters 2 and 3. In order 
to make them more clear and understandable I will devote the current part of the 
thesis to the brief description of realism and neorealism as the prevalent conceptions 
of the contemporary international relations and the way in which it influences the 
modern foreign policy of the Russian Federation (hereafter, the RF). Taking into the 
account the fact that the realistic theory is a thorough one, I am going to concentrate 
on the issues which are related to the problems of national interests, security, and 
power politics only. 
 
          1.1 Realism and Neorealism in Theory. 
                     
          Realists describe the international system as an anarchy which shows itself in 
the   absence of the common government (central power) which enforce norms for all. 
As a result of it, the interaction of the states is very chaotic. Besides this, realists 
believe that the very existence of the state is dependent on the punctual and efficient 
following of its interests, which can be defined by the geographical conditions, 
egoistical human nature, traditions etc. In the conditions of anarchy the most 
important problem for the state is to determine which foreign policy will answer better 
to its national interests. According to Hans J. Morgentau, “the main signpost that 
helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is 
the concept of interest defined in terms of power”10. Logically, that the state tends to 
obtain the maximum of power, which helps it to achieve security: than more power 
the state has than more secure it “feels” in the conditions of anarchy.  
          It is obvious that national interests of different states opposite each other. Thus, 
interstate conflicts and even wars become dominating process on the international 
                                                 
10
 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace (Boston: McGraw - 
Hill, 1993) 5. 
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politics. Facing up with the regular threat of the national interests, the state is always 
anxious about its security and trying to protect it with the help of strategy and 
diplomacy, both of which are based on power. Consequently, the phenomenon of 
power is seen by the realists as the base and the goal of foreign policy for every state.  
          Moreover, each state, on the one hand, is interested in the consolidation and the 
expansion of its power and opportunities. For another hand, each state is trying not to 
allow the situation when the power of its rivals exceeds its own in such an extent that 
it becomes dangerous for the state’ security. Thus, it can be said that states are looking 
for a balance of power (a system, which helps to avert the predominance of any state 
in this system). As Nicholas J. Spykman put it: “The truth of the matter is that states 
are interested only in balance which is their favor. Not an equilibrium, but a generous 
margin is their objective. [...] The balance desired is the one which neutralizes other 
states, leaving the home state free to be the deciding force and the deciding voice”11. 
          It is widely accepted fact that realism was the dominating theory in 
international relations in 1940 – 1970s. Not surprisingly, because realists’ main ideas 
about the interaction and rivalry of the states at the international scene reflected 
realities of the World War II and the Cold War. Changes in world (and especially in 
Europe) which were influenced by trade development, co – operation and integration 
processes led to the situation when it became harder to explain the existing world 
order in the framework of classical realism. As the result of the demand of time, 
realism has started to change and by the end of the 1970s neorealism (structural 
realism12) was formed.   
          Neorealism also operates with the power category, however does not 
concentrate on the military aspect only (as realists does). As Kenneth N. Waltz 
mentioned: “The economic, military, and other capabilities of nations cannot be 
sectored and separately weighed. [...] Their [states] rank depends on how they score 
                                                 
11
 Nicholas J. Spykman, “America’s Strategy in World Politics: the United States and the Balance of 
Power”, Knihy Google, 25 Mar. 2010, 
<http://books.google.cz/books?id=rsIwxKfuHwIC&lpg=PP1&ots=id3a1TDbgG&dq=spykman%20am
erica's%20strategy%20in%20world%20politics&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q=&f=false>. 
12
 Kenneth N. Waltz (one of the founders of structural realism) believes that although it is necessary to 
study separate states (actors) in order to understand the essence of international relations, at the same 
time, it is impossible to explain the system of international relations basing only on characteristics of 
these separate actors or even groups of actors. The decisive and determinative significance in the 
international relations plays the system of international relations itself, its structure. It is precisely the 
structure, which predetermines the distribution of opportunities and potential between the states. (The 
definition of the structural realism was taken from: M. M. Lebedeva, Mirovaja Politika: Uchebnik dlja 
VUZov [International Politics: the Textbook for Higher Schools] (Moskva: Aspect Press, 2007) 33; 
Italics mine). 
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on all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, 
economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence”13. On the 
whole, the combination of “items” is seen by states as the resources for gaining and 
increasing power in order to protect their own survival and security. Obviously, that 
the state with the greater power gains more advantages and interested in the protection 
of the current international situation. According to Waltz14, there are four such 
benefits which greater power provides for its possessors. To begin with the wider 
margins of safety in comparison with the less power state and the opportunity to 
choose the game to play and rules to keep. Secondly, it helps with the means of 
ensuring one’s autonomy for the withstanding against force that others have. Thirdly, 
greater power allows the bigger scope of action while leaving the results of it 
uncertain. Finally, it provides a considerable stake for the power’ “owner” and the 
ability to take firm action for its sake. 
          Waltz also emphasizes the exceptional nature of international anarchy15: there 
is a clear division between structures of domestic and international systems. While 
domestic system is seen as centralized and hierarchic, the international one is 
described as anarchic and decentralized. Therefore, the international system (in the 
absence of centralized authorities or ultimate institutions which can enforce 
international laws) is characterized by the lack of trust between states which in the 
(classical/neo) – realist paradigm is known as a “security dilemma”16.    
          Explaining the problems which decision – makers, acting in the international 
system, have to solve in order to protect their interests, safety and power, Robert 
Jerwis17 stressed that the security dilemma is the only one of three problems which 
influences state’ foreign policy. To begin with the already mentioned security 
                                                 
13
 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979) 131. 
14
 Waltz, 194 – 195. 
15
 Waltz, 88. Italics mine. 
16
 The security dilemma can be defined as a strategic problem in relation between states and other 
actors, which consists of two levels, subdivided on two related lemmas, which make decision – makers 
to choose between them. While the first (basic) level consists of dilemma of interpretation of the 
capabilities, motives of others, the second (derivative) level consists of a dilemma of response which is 
about the choosing the most rational and suitable way to react. For the detailed explanation see Paul D. 
Williams (ed.), “Security Studies: an Introduction”, Knihy Google, 26 Mar. 2010, 
<http://books.google.cz/books?id=YVYhFYbELB8C&pg=PA141&lpg=PA141&dq=security+dilemma
+definition&source=bl&ots=ApzW8_h2Zy&sig=j1IIcBK2CO0YAnSlYm1iBoaK8j4&hl=cs&ei=jLW
vS83bNMfcsAbD-
dy1Dg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=9&ved=0CEgQ6AEwCA#v=onepage&q=security
%20dilemma%20definition&f=false>. 
17
 Robert Jervis. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma”. International Politic: Anarchy, Force, 
Political Economy, and Decision – Making. Ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1985) 87 – 88. 
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dilemma, which is explained as the means which used by the state for increasing its 
own security and for decreasing the security of other actors (this situation would 
definitely disturb them). After, it is the potent fear of the dissatisfaction in the current 
balance of power by the other states (it is hard to say who would be leaders of 
neighbor states (as well as of the most powerful states in the world) in the future and 
how they could change their mind about the foreign policy’ priorities and whether 
their new foreign policy would have aggressive motives). Lastly, it is a problem as a 
result of some possible solution. In order to protect themselves, states seek to control 
resources or land which are outside their own territory (so called “ideological buffer 
zones”) and this could alarm others. 
          After the defining the meaning of power and its advantages for neorealists, as 
well as what they consider to be the main problems for the decision – makers to settle 
while acting in the international (anarchical) system, I think it will be logical to pay 
attention to the ways of solving such a difficulties and protecting actor’s power.  
          Although neorealists agree with the statement that actors have to operate in the 
self – help world being uncertain about intentions of others states, and that every actor 
seeks to ensure its own survival, there is a substantial disagreement among them about 
how much power for a state is enough. According to the views on the suitable 
“volume” of power needed and actions towards its possessing, there are defensive and 
offensive branches of neorealism can be distinguished18.  
          Being the representative of offensive realism, John J. Mearsheimer, on the one 
hand, points out that power states should always be looking to gain as much power as 
possible in order to become hegemony, because it is seen as the best opportunity to 
survive and to be secure. Besides this, Mersheimer believes that moving toward this 
aim states should do everything possible and should constantly looking for ways to 
get advantages over each other19.  
          For another hand, the defensive realist Kenneth N. Waltz affirms that whereas 
the main aim of the great powers is to increase their security, they need to undertake 
actions towards the decreasing of other states’ security only in cases when the risk of 
bringing down its own is insignificant. It can be said, that states are trying to maintain 
                                                 
18
 The division of realism on “defensive” and “offensive” was proposed by professor John J. 
Mearsheimer. 
19
 John J. Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism”, Studijní Informační Systém, 26 Mar. 2010 
<https://is.cuni.cz/eng/studium/predmety/index.php?id=f1253b3aa0303e74ad8b30d5f6e36095&tid=&d
o=down&did=3390>. 
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the existing balance of power instead of destroying it. Furthermore, Waltz speaks 
about an appropriate amount of power: states should keep the carefulness and do not 
try to attain the excessive “amount” of power. If some state becomes too powerful, the 
coalition against it will appear and, as the result, this state could become less secure 
than it was before20.    
          The examples of offensive policies of Imperial Germany, Nazi Germany, the 
Soviet Union (at the times of the Cold War) which were pretending to become 
hegemonic power, have shown that these states after all were not successful in their 
expansionists aspirations, and that the aggression is not the right way to make the state 
secure. I believe that nowadays great powers (including the RF) are tending to employ 
the defensive realism principles of neorealism, which provide moderate strategies for 
the national security ensuring.  
 
          1.2. (Neo)realism in Practice. The Russian Foreign and Security Policy. 
 
          Analyzing laws in force of the Russian Government concerning foreign policy 
and national security, one may noticed that Russia operates there with the categories 
of (neo)realism. For instance, there is an affirmation at The Foreign Policy Concept of 
the Russian Federation (hereafter, the Concept) that Russia starts to play from the 
beginning of the current century “the increased role [...] in international affairs” and 
has “greater responsibility for global developments and related possibilities to 
participate in the implementation of the international agenda, as well as in its 
development”21. It definitely means that Russia sees itself as a great power with “a 
full - fledged role in global affairs”. Not surprisingly, that the country is planning to 
materialize the policy as the great power in the future: one of the declared country’s 
aims is preserving and strengthening strong positions in the world community that 
best reflects the interests of Russia “as one of influential centers in the modern 
world”.  
                                                 
20
 P. A. Tsygankov, Mezhdunarodnyje Otnoshenija: Teorii, Konflikty, Dvizhenija, Organizatsii 
[International Relations: Theories, Conflicts, Movements, Organizations] (Moskva: Al’fa - M: INFRA 
- M, 2008) 55. 
21
 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation [approved by D. Medvedev, President of the 
Russian Federation on 12th of April 2008], The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 
12 Jul. 2008, 27 Mar. 2010 <http://www.mid.ru/ns-
osndoc.nsf/0e9272befa34209743256c630042d1aa/cef95560654d4ca5c32574960036cddb?OpenDocum
ent>. From this moment and until the further notice (throughout extent of the current chapter) I am 
quoting the document mentioned in this reference. 
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          Among the common for all states challenges and threats to settle (such as 
international terrorism, regional conflicts, spread of weapons of mass destruction, as 
well as a number of ecological, social, economic and security issues), the Conception 
points out on the necessity for the RF (as for the great power) to overcome some 
special problem, namely: “continued political and psychological policy of 
“containing” Russia”. In my opinion, the existence of the last problem can be easily 
explained from the (neo)realistic point of view. According to the Russian foreign 
policy – makers, the country is located in the epicenter of the struggle for power and 
being influential actor in the sphere of international relations, the RF faces up with the 
negative reaction of the “historic West”, which is interested in the preservation of its 
monopoly in global processes. There is no doubt that Russia is going to stand up its 
reviving international influence which is seen as the means for its national interests 
promoting. Understanding the national power in neorealist meaning, the RF proclaims 
its desire to promote “foreign economic interests and provision of political, economic, 
information and cultural influence abroad”. What is more, the decision – makers also 
declares that the country is going to use all the available economic and financial tools 
of the state in order to realize its interests. 
          It is absolutely clear, that the RF in its foreign policy acts according to the 
defensive realism principles. The first point in favor of this statement is that “Russia 
consistently calls for diminished role of the force factor in international relations”. 
Another one argument to put forward is the fact that the RF is intending to 
commensurate the use of military, political, economic, financial and other instruments 
with the real value of foreign policy tasks. Finally, the state tends to organize its 
relationship with NATO in a way of averting a danger of increasing one’s security at 
the expense of security of the RF. Thus, such declarations can be recognized as the 
intensions of Russia to solve the security dilemma problem and to decrease the 
possible outcomes of the dissatisfaction in the current balance of power by the other 
states. 
          When discussing the foreign policy of Russia it is much more interesting to 
determine how exactly (by which means) the RF is going to pursue this policy. 
According to the Concept, the state is going to undertake some economic levers. 
Trying, on the one hand, to overcome the resource - based dependence of the 
economy, for another hand, Russia is declaring about its readiness to use all available 
economic instruments and resources for protecting her national interests. To achieve 
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this goal, the state will continue to increase the potential of the fuel and energy 
industries to support its reputation as a responsible partner, and, at the same time, to 
facilitate development of own economy. Moreover, the RF reserves for itself rights 
for creating “favorable conditions for diversifying Russia’s presence in the world 
markets”, for taking trade policy measures in order to protect and promote interests of 
the country, and for active implementing the possibilities of regional economic and 
financial organizations in “the corresponding regions” in order to secure interests of 
the RF. The last one measure can be classified as an intention to create mentioned 
above ideological buffer zones in the CIS space22, which Russia traditionally includes 
in its “sphere of influence”. On the whole, it is obvious that the RF is going to use her 
natural resources as one of the most influential levers in the foreign policy 
implementation.  
          According to The Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation 
until the Year 202023 (hereafter, the Security Strategy), Russian authorities understand 
that in the conditions of uneven distribution of natural resources between countries, 
the issues of energy resources possession will continue to be the object of the close 
attention in the international sphere. In this situation Russia (as the largest energy 
producer and exporter) sees as one of the main tasks of the state security the 
protection of the country from the following risks and threats, namely: the lost of 
control over national resources, the aggravation of the energetic source state, the 
deficit of the country’s fuel and energetic sources and the discrimination against the 
RF. From this point of view, energy sources possession is seen by Russia not only as 
the effective lever for the foreign policy promoting, but also as the tool for security 
goals realization when great powers implement against Russia policy of constraining.  
          Finally I would like to restate my opinion about unconditional and undisguised 
embodiment of realists’ power category by Russia (including sphere of energy sector). 
A convincing example of this is article by Sergei Lavrov24 (the Minister of Foreign 
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 At present the CIS unites: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
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 Strategija Natsional’noj Bezopasnosti Rosijskoj Federatsii do 2020 goda [The National Security 
Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020] [approved by D. Medvedev – President of the RF, 12 
May, 2009], Ministerstvo Inostrannyh Del Rossijskoj Federatsii [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 12 
May 2009, 27 Mar. 2010 <http://www.mid.ru/ns-
osndoc.nsf/0e9272befa34209743256c630042d1aa/8abb3c17eb3d2626c32575b500320ae4?OpenDocu
ment>. 
24
 Sergei Lavrov, “Containing Russia: Back to the Future?”, Russia in Global Affairs, 18 Nov. 2007, 27 
Mar. 2010 <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/21/1147.html>.  
Chapter 1. Realism and Neorealism as the Guidance in the Modern International Relations 
 28 
Affairs of the RF from the year 2004), where he states that “energy is viewed in 
Russia as a strategic industry” and “it would be right to say that we view our role in 
global energy supply as a means for ensuring our foreign – policy independence”. As 
well as this, S. Lavrov bluntly answers on the criticism of Russia by the other states 
for her visible role in the global energy sector. According to him, it is just “a 
manifestation of complexes from countries that cannot reconcile themselves to their 
dependence on external sources of energy” and these countries are definitely 
“unhappy about a strong Russia”.
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CHAPTER 2. 
NATURAL GAS MARKETS. 
 
 
          The first chapter has showed the obvious link between energy resources 
possessions and national security and foreign policy in the contemporary Russia. 
What is more, the desire of the Russian authorities to exploit this dependence in the 
future is beyond all manner of doubt. For this reason the current chapter will provide 
analysis of the reasonableness of such aspirations in regards to natural gas resources 
as one of the major sources of global energy. Firstly, the chapter will provide the 
general description of the international and the European Union (hereafter, the EU) 
natural gas markets in respect of proved gas reserves, its production, consumption, 
and main export – import movements. Additionally, the analysis of the EU’s 
dependency from natural gas import (including that of from the RF) will be offered.   
After, the information concerning the present and future of Russia’s natural gas export 
trends will be presented. Taking into consideration the fact that suppliers of the rival 
Nabucco pipeline will be Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, the third part of the chapter 
will focus on the natural gas producing and exporting potentials of these countries. 
 
          2.1. International Natural Gas Market. 
 
          According to the data available (see Figures 1, 2) the world proved natural gas 
reserves at end 2008 constituted 185,02 trillion cubic meters. The most considerable 
reserves were concentrated in Middle East region with its 75,91 trillion cubic meters 
(hereafter, tcm) or 41,0 per cents from total reserves. European and Eurasian common 
reserves were fixed almost at the same level, namely: 62,89 tcm and 34,0 per cents 
respectively. At the same time, the stockpiles of Asian Pacific and African regions 
formed 15,39 tcm (8,3 per cents) and 14,65 tcm (7,9 per cents) correspondingly. 
Natural gas stocks of North America and South and Central America did not exceeded 
5,0 per cents each. As British Petroleum reported25, the main gas fields “owners” in 
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 “Natural Gas. Proved Reserves”, British Petroleum Global, 01 Apr. 2010, 
<http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/sta
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the Middle East region were Iran (29,61 tcm or 16,0 per cents from total world 
reserves) and Qatar (25,46 tcm or 13,8 per cents) and in European and Eurasian 
region – the RF (43,3 tcm or 23,4 per cents). 
          Total amount of the produced natural gas came to 3.065,60 billion cubic meters 
(hereafter, bcm) by the end of 2008 year. Leader in natural gas producing was the RF 
with 601,70 bcm of gas produced which formed 19,6 per cents of total production. 
The second position was held by the United States with their 582,20 bcm (19,3 per 
cents) (see Table 1). Among other producers with more or less visible shares in global 
production can be mentioned Canada, Iran, Norway, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
China, Indonesia, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands26. 
          The main consumers in the year 2008 were the United States and Russia with 
22,0 per cents and 13,9 per cents of total world consumption respectively (see Table 
2). Other considerable consumers in the same year were Iran, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, Japan, Germany, China, Saudi Arabia, Italy and Mexico27. On the whole, 
3.018,70 bcm of natural gas were consumed in 200828. 
         The most substantial export movements in the year 2008 were from the 
European and Eurasian region: 349,94 bcm of natural gas were exported and this 
constituted 59,6 per cents of total world export29. Not surprisingly, that the main 
exporters in the mentioned region were the RF with 154,41 bcm, Norway with 92,78 
bcm and the Netherlands with 55,00 bcm (the common share of these states in the 
total world export accounted for 51,46 per cents) (see Table 3 and Figure 3).  
Principal importers in the European and Eurasian regions in the same year were 
Germany (87,10 bcm of imported natural gas), Italy (75,31 bcm), France (36,66 bcm), 
the United Kingdom (35,42 bcm), and Turkey (32,30) (see Table 4 and Figure 4). 
                                                                                                                                            
tistical_energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2009_downloads/gas_table_of_proved_natural_g
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 Here I have listed countries with individual shares no less than 2,2 per cents in total natural gas 
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countries in sum produced 29,8 per cents of total natural gas production in 2008 (for more information 
see Table 1). 
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 Countries, enumerated in this paragraph in the decreasing order of their shares, had no less than 2,2 
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for 26,2 per cents of total world consumption (for more information see Table 2). 
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          Another one perceptible region actively involved in export – import operations 
of natural gas was North America. According to the British Petroleum report30, 130,59 
bcm (or 22,2 per cents of total) were exported in the region. The main natural gas 
movements in 2008 were between Canada and the United States: Canada delivered to 
the US 103,20 bcm of natural gas. 
          On balance, it can be seen that Russia due to its considerable reserves of natural 
gas held one of the leading positions in world natural gas production, consumption, 
and in export and import operations. 
 
          2.2. The Gas Market of the European Union31. 
 
          In this part of the thesis I would like to provide more detailed overview of the 
gas market of the EU by the end of the year 2008 as a result of its development in the 
last fifteen years. 
          According to the British Petroleum statistical review32, the EU posed 
insignificant natural gas reserves: only 2,87 tcm or 1,6 per cents of the world proven 
reserves at end 2008. What is more, these reserves were declining steadily: from 4,21 
tcm to 2,87 tcm between 1999 and 2008 (see Figure 5). Similarly, this trend continued 
in natural gas production in the region: there was a continuous decrease on 37,10 bcm 
in total from the year 2004 (227,40 bcm) till the year 2008 (190,30 bcm). The share of 
the EU in the global natural gas production in 2008 accounted at 6,2 per cents only33. 
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The main producers of the EU region (by the end of 2008) were the Netherlands, and 
the United Kingdom (see Table 1). 
          On the other hand, if we accept the EU as the one unit, than it can be classified 
as the second largest consumer of natural gas in the world, with 16,2 per cents of the 
world’s total gas consumption in 200834. The consumption rose dramatically from 
401,40 bcm in 1997 to reach 490,10 in 2008 (see Figure 7). The principal consumers 
of natural gas in the region (by the end of 2008) were Germany, Italy and the United 
Kingdom (see Table 2). It is also important to notice, that the portion of natural gas 
consumption in the EU’s total energy consumption (oil, natural gas, nuclear, coal, 
renewables) has rocketed sharply over the last three decades and it is supposed to 
continue its rise35. 
         According to the data mentioned above, in 2008 the EU consumed almost on 2,6 
times more than produced. The same distinction between producing and consumption 
can be seen from the Figure 8, which presents data for the period between 1994 and 
2008. This exceeded consumption was the result of the significant amounts of import. 
Only in 2008 the EU imported 351,74 bcm of natural gas36 that accounted for 59,9 per 
cents of total gas imports. Thus, the EU (as a unit) could be classified as the biggest 
importer in the world. It is known, that the bulk of natural gas exporters to the EU 
(and which are located outside the EU itself) are the RF, Norway and Algeria. It 
would appear from the statistics37, that in 2008 Algeria exported 23,34 bcm (6,64 per 
cents in total natural gas export to the EU), Norway delivered 92,69 bcm (26,35 per 
cents), and Russia supplied 124,92 bcm (35,51 per cents). These three countries in 
common exported 68,5 per cents of natural gas to the EU. What is more, as some 
researchers predicted, “on current trends, gas imports [from the RF, Norway and 
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Algeria] would increase to 80,0 per cents over the next 25 years”38. Besides this, the 
share of the natural gas imported from Russia in the total gas consumption of the 
whole EU can also be mentioned as significant – it accounted for 25,49 per cents. 
Similarly, Russia is the most important external supplier of the EU.   
          Analyzing the obvious importance of the imported gas for the EU, it would be 
interesting to determine which countries of the EU and to which extent were 
dependent from import, including the Russian imported natural gas (by pipeline) in 
the year 2006. According to the statistics, provided by the European Commission’s 
Directorate – General for Energy and Transport39 and Eni S. p. A (an Italian 
multinational gas and oil company)40, all member – states of the EU I suggest to 
divide into five groups on the base of the level of their dependence from natural gas 
import in the whole and from import of natural gas from Russia specifically: 
independent states, countries with less dependency, normal, high and full dependency. 
Thus, following six countries can be classified as independent: Cyprus, Malta – due to 
the absence of natural gas import; the United Kingdom – due to the insignificant 
dependency rate (10,0 per cents only); the Netherlands – because of stocks of natural 
gas and, finally, Denmark – owing to the absence of import and sufficient stocks of 
gas. Romania can be placed into the group of less dependent countries (30,0 per 
cents), Poland – to the group of highly dependent states. Other member – states of the 
EU were absolutely dependent from natural gas import in 2006 (dependency rates 
varied from 70,0 to 100,0 per cents).  Concerning the dependency on natural gas 
imported from Russia in the same year, almost half from 27 countries of the EU could 
be recognized as highly dependent (Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary 
and Romania) and as fully dependent (Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Finland, 
Greece and Slovakia). Despite the fact of the considerable natural gas consuming 
capacity, France and Italy could be classified as countries less dependent from 
Russian natural gas and Germany – as a country with normal/middle dependency 
thanks to their diverse natural gas deliveries (for more information see Tables 5a and 
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5b). On the whole, the European Union is dependent from Russian natural gas 
import41 and this situation, aggravated by the number of recent disturbances in natural 
gas supply because of conflicts between the RF and Ukraine (as a transit country), has 
forced the member – states to think about the possible risk of supply failure in the 
future. As a result of it, securing of European energy supply takes an important 
position in the EU’s agenda. In order to achieve this goal, The 2006 Green Paper42 
offers, for instance, to diversify suppliers, transport routes and transport mechanisms. 
Secondly, the organization of reliable partnerships between suppliers, transit and 
consumer countries is supposed to decline the risk of the energy dependency. Then, 
the improving of conditions for European companies seeking access to global 
resources as well as the provision of natural gas reserves are believed to decrease the 
supply failures. Additionally, the putting a new common policy into practice (with the 
common opinion on the energy questions) is suggested to help a lot in energy security 
providing. In my point of view, the embodiment of the last proposal could face up 
with some impediments. For example, the elaboration of a common policy towards 
main energy suppliers (such as Russia) could become a controversial issue, which 
would affect “gas relationships” in the future. The first thing to consider while 
discussing potential difficulties is the normal desire of each member – state to provide 
cheap natural gas resources for its own needs. For the decision – makers would be 
hard to explain their compatriots why they have to undertake some unprofitable or 
unfavorable measures in order to help some other member – state. The second point I 
would like to make is the possibility of a disagreement between member – states 
about the attitude towards Russia as one of the principal exporters of natural gas to the 
EU. One illustration of this is the modest opinion of Loyola de Palacio43, who, on the 
one hand, mentioned the necessity of the diversification of supply resources and their 
routes, and for another hand, she did not see as a big problem the dependency from 
external resources. As the main argument L. de Palacio stated the mutual 
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interdependence between suppliers and consumers of natural gas. “Not only is Europe 
dependent on gas supplies from non – EU producers, but the producing countries 
depend also very much on the revenues gained through gas exports”44. In contrast, 
there is a negative opinion of Sandra Kalniete45, who is not expected Russia to be a 
reliable partner, which is not going to negotiate with the EU on equal terms. Although 
S. Kalniete in her article46 supposed the RF to be the ambivalent country - “Russia is 
not an enemy at the gates, but neither is it a friend of the united Europe”, I would say 
that she looked at the foreign policy of the RF as on the real threat for the EU. True, 
Russia uses and is planning to employ in the future its energy resources as the means 
in foreign policy implementing, but it does not mean that the RF is going to act in this 
point at any price and what it would lead  to the “geopolitical fragility of the region 
[of Eastern Europe]”. Describing the problems of the EU’s energy security, S. 
Kalniete has not mentioned only Russia as a cause of the Eastern Europe countries 
uncertainty and the exclusion. According to her, a number of politicians from Eastern 
Europe were stung by the bilateral relations and agreements concerning new pipelines 
construction between the RF and the EU’s largest countries - and this situation was 
quite emotionally defined by Radosław Sikorski (the Polish Foreign Minister) as “a 
new version of the 1939 Molotov – Ribbentrop Pact which divided Europe into the 
spheres of influence of two major powers”. Consequently it can be said, that until the 
different “camps” of the EU’ countries with the differing views about the possible 
extent of energy dependency would not come to the common solution (coordinated 
energy policy), Russia would be relatively free in implementing its foreign policy 
with the help of energy means.  
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          2.3. Russian Natural Gas Market. 
 
          By the end 200847 Russia held the largest proved natural gas reserves, was the 
leader in natural gas producing, had the second place in consuming, and the first place 
in exporting – due to all these facts the RF can be classified as a major member of the 
world natural gas market. Additionally, according to the data available48, Russia also 
owns two thirds of the largest natural gas fields (the majority of them are located in 
Western Siberia). It is also have been reported49, that in period between 2005 – 2008 
seven new hydrocarbon fields were discovered, 28 deposits were found in the fields 
discovered earlier.  Besides this, considerable natural gas fields are believed to exist in 
Eastern Siberia and under the Barents Sea. 
          Owing to its advantages, such as already explored reserves (Figure 9), sufficient 
export volumes of natural gas (Figure 10), its geographical and geopolitical position, 
Russia has the unique opportunity to export natural gas in different directions to the 
CIS, the EU, and other countries50 (Figure 11). Since the 2.2 section of the current 
chapter already contains the information concerning the main importers of the Russian 
natural gas in the EU, here I would like to mention other important consumers. It can 
be seen from the statistics available51, that Turkey, Ukraine and Belarus received the 
biggest volumes of Russian natural gas in 2008 (24,00, 56,00 and 21,00 bcm 
respectively). Besides this, according to The Energy Strategy of Russia until 2020 
(hereafter, the Energy Strategy)52, Russia in planning to consolidate its future 
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presence on the internal energy markets of other countries. Another statement of the 
Energy Strategy that “export of energy resources is remaining the key factor […] for 
the economic and political position development of Russia in the world” is just 
another confirmation of the deep interconnections between energy policy aims and 
foreign and national security policies. These goals are supposed to be reached by the 
diversification of natural gas routes, increased natural gas extraction and exporting. 
First of all, according to the forecasts, the extraction of natural gas will be increased 
on 7,0 – 12,0 per cents in 2010 and on 14,0 – 23,0 per cents in 2020 (in comparison 
with the level of 2002). Secondly, natural gas export is supposed to increase on almost 
33,0 per cents in 2020 in comparison with the level of 2002. Thirdly, trying to attain 
the higher level of economic and energetic security, the development of northern, 
eastern and southern export routes (with the following increase of their shares) is 
planned. Although the energetic markets of the CIS and the EU area will remain the 
main markets for the Russian gas in the coming 20 – 25 years, the rising demand on 
gas in the Pacific regions is seen as a great opportunity for diversifying natural gas 
supply. China, India, Japan and Korea are supposed to be the main partners of Russia 
in this respect. According to the Energy Strategy, the forecasting need for natural gas 
in these countries will increase up to 15,0 per cents in 2020 in comparison with the 
level of 2002. 
          Another point to look at while analyzing Russian natural gas market is the 
dependency of the country on transit – countries. On the one hand, the neighborhood 
with the natural gas consumers provides the significant opportunity for Russia to 
reach its economic and political goals with the help of gas pipelines; for another hand, 
this very fact makes the RF vulnerable from their relationships with transit – states 
(recent problems with Belarus and Ukraine are convincing facts of it). Such problems 
make questionable the ensuring of the Russian political interests in Europe and 
strengthen pipeline issues as one of the main means in the foreign policy 
implementations. As it is stated in the Energy Strategy, “transit problems play an 
important role. Due to this fact, Russia has all the necessary prerequisites for transit to 
provide the reliable energy supply, the effective export and the revenues from transit 
                                                                                                                                            
the further notice (throughout extent of the current chapter) I am quoting the document mentioned in 
this reference. 
Chapter 2. Natural Gas Markets 
 38 
operations”53. In order to decline its dependency from the transit problems, the RF has 
already undertaken a number of measures, among them: subsidizing energy exports to 
neighboring states in order to receive control over their transit infrastructure, stopping 
energy supplies to states which complicate transit movements in order to attain 
control over energy infrastructure in these countries, and commissioning expensive 
alternative transit infrastructure. Russia’s investment decisions concerning the 
constructions of new pipelines demonstrate that new and costly transport directions 
are much more preferable for the RF than the servicing of already existing nets which 
ran through Belarus, Ukraine, and the Baltic States54. 
          Another one point to consider while discussing natural gas market in Russia is 
Gazprom – the one of the most important actors in energy politics not only in Russia 
but also in the world. The company is specializing in geological exploration, 
production, transportation, storage, processing and marketing of natural gas. 
According to the information available at Gazprom website55, the company possesses 
the world’s largest natural gas reserves, with 17,0 per cents of the global gas 
production, Gazprom Group is the leader among the world’s oil and gas companies. 
Besides this, Gazprom owns the world’s largest gas transmission long - distance 
system, which is capable to deliver natural gas to consumers inside and outside the 
state. Moreover, Gazprom held the leading position among European companies 
by market capitalization in 2008. The fact, that the state owns a controlling stake in 
Gazprom (50,0002 per cents) means that the company has responsibilities before 
state, for instance: the obligation to pay expenses on construction of new pipelines 
Nord Stream and South Stream. These new export pipelines are intended to fulfill the 
state program of natural gas routes diversification and the increase the energy (read 
“economic”, “political”) security of the state.  
          In order to conclude with the role, which Gazprom plays in the Russian foreign 
policy and how Russia is going to use it, a few Putin’s quotes would be enough: 
“Gazprom is a powerful political and economic lever of influence over the rest of the 
world” and “The gas pipeline system is the creation of the Soviet Union. We intend to 
retain state control over the gas transportation system and over Gazprom. We will not 
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divide Gazprom. And the European Commission should not have any illusions. In the 
gas sector, they will have to deal with the [Russian] state”56. 
 
          2.4. Turkmen Natural Gas Market. 
 
          It is known, that gas production in the country is carrying out in 149 gas fields: 
139 of them are located in inland area, and 10 – along the coast of the Caspian Sea. 
Additionally, more than 60 gas fields have been explored in the Eastern part of 
Turkmenistan only in recent years57. According to the statistical review of British 
Petroleum58, proved reserves of natural gas in Turkmenistan at end 2008 accounted 
for 7,94 tcm or 4,3 per cents of the global world reserves (the fourth largest natural 
gas reserves in the world). There was a dramatic increase of the reserves (on 227,60 
per cents) in the year 2008 in comparison with the previous year, when natural gas 
stocks were fixed at the level of 2,43 tcm only (see Figure 12). As media reported59, 
such a sustainable increase of reserves was result of the survey of the British oil and 
gas advisory firm Gaffney Cline & Associates, which confirmed in 2008, that the 
South Yolotan - Osman field in the eastern part of Turkmenistan contained between 4 
and 14 tcm of gas in place. As a result, the country received the status of one of the 
world's great hydrocarbon areas with the significant producing and exporting 
potential. 
          Natural gas production level in the country between 1994 and 2008  fluctuated 
steeply: it dropped dramatically from 32,30 bcm in 1994 to 12,00 bcm in 1998, then 
rocketed to 42,50 bcm in 2000, and after there was a gradual increase till the year 
2008 when the production reached its peak of 66,1 bcm for the analyzing period (see 
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Figure 13). Besides this, Turkmen officials believes60, that the production level could 
be doubled with the help of South Iolotan – Osman field, which, as supposed, could 
produce about 70,00 bcm a year, roughly as much as the whole country produces at 
the moment. 
          The consumption showed almost steady rise for the period between 1994 and 
2008 (there was only one fact of its decline in 1995 to 7,80 bcm). The maximum level 
of consumption was reached in 2007 and accounted for 21,30 bcm. The decline, 
which occurred in the year 2008 can be recognized as insignificant – it leveled off the 
consumption on 10,9 per cents only (see Figure 13 for more information). 
          What is more, existing export capacity can be classified as considerable. 
Although there was a difficult situation in 1997 – 1998, afterwards the export 
conditions have become more favorable. The production started to exceed the 
consumption in more visible way from 2000 (on 30,30 bcm) and this trend continued 
to develop: the excess accounted for 47,10 bcm in 2008 (see Figure 13).  
          Nowadays Turkmenistan exports its gas to Russia, Ukraine and Iran61. As some 
researchers believe62, Turkmenistan could have much more significant export 
directions, but the former President of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Niyazov refused in 
the late 1990s to accept the proposal of the PSG consortium, supported by Turkey and 
the US, to build a pipeline, which would provide gas to Turkey and the EU. As a 
result, being left without other options, the country started to sell gas to Gazprom but 
substantially below Gazprom’s gas sales to Europe. 
          On balance, Turkmenistan has a real capacity to change the geography of its 
natural gas export and to sell gas to such regions as India, Pakistan, and the EU due to 
it big reserves. Moreover, official Turkmenistan said its total reserves exceed 20,0 tcm 
- much more than data estimated by British Petroleum in its annual statistical 
review63. Besides this, as Russian Information Agency Novosti reported64, 
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Turkmenistan also supposed, that its natural gas export would accounted for 100,00 
bcm in 2010, and by the year 2020 it would be increased to 140,00 bcm. Furthermore, 
according to the same agency (RIA Novosti)65, the average price of Turkmen’s natural 
gas in 2009 (340,0 US $ for 1.000,00 cubic meters) was much more competitive in 
comparison with the Russian (up to 500,0 US $ for 1.000,00 cubic meters) or the 
Norwegian (700,0 US $ for 1.000,0 cubic meters) ones. In my point of view, what 
Turkmenistan is really needs in this situation (in order to compete successfully with 
the RF on the international natural gas market) is an official confirmation of 
independent researches concerning their gas stocks (what is required in order to 
convince these regions in the reality of such projects) and to negotiate effectively with 
countries, interested in the diversification of natural gas import. However, the 
Turkmenistan officials have already declared their preference to sell natural gas to 
Russia (according to a long – term gas purchase contract), saying that “there will 
always be enough Turkmen gas for Russia”66.  
 
          2.5. Azerbaijani Natural Gas Market. 
 
          In comparison with Turkmenistan, Azerbaijani natural gas reserves are not so 
big (1,2 tcm and 0,6 per cents from total reserves by the end of 200867) and due to this 
indicator, the country was put on the 24th place in the list of natural gas reserves 
“owners”68. There was a visible increase of reserves in 1999 up to 1,24 tcm from 0,81 
tcm in 1998, afterwards the changing for the period from 1997 to 2008 was not very 
important (see Figure 14). The reason of the reserves’ rise was the discovery of the 
Shak Deniz field in 1999. It is known, that natural gas deposits from this field are 
supposed to be used for the Nabucco pipeline fulfillment. In addition to the existed 
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gas stocks, the forecasted natural gas reserves are supposed to reach level of 5,00 – 
6,00 tcm69. 
          Production of natural gas in the country slightly fluctuated from 4,50 bcm to 
6,10 bcm in interval between 1994 and 2006, and from 2007 the level of production 
started to increase sharply (in 2007 it accounted for 9,80 bcm, in 2008 – 14,70 bcm) 
(see Figure 15).  
          The level of domestic consumption started to decrease from the year 1996 
(11,40 bcm) till the year 2005 (5,20 bcm), but afterwards this trend reversed and 
thanks to the exploitation of  Shak Deniz the consumption stood at 7,50 – 7,70 bcm in 
2006 - 2008 (see Figure 15).  
          Since the consumption of natural gas exceeded its domestic production, 
Azerbaijan had to import gas between 1994 and 2006 (See Figure 15 for more 
information). According to the States Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan Republic70, 
importers of that period were Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Russia: if 
natural gas from the Central Asia has been constituted the main share of imported gas 
till the year 2005, for the last year of gas importing (2006), share of the RF increased 
to almost 74,0 per cents.  
          The reserves of Shak Deniz field have helped to Azerbaijan to become a net 
exporter of natural gas. The country exported 7,00 bcm of gas in 2008 (Figure 15). 
Finally, Azerbaijani’s growing natural gas export capacities, cold relationship 
between Russia and Azerbaijan since the collapse of the Soviet Union71, and the 
competitive price of Azerbaijani’s natural gas in comparison with the Russian one72 
have become the reasons of the country’s including as the supplier in Nabucco 
project. Nonetheless, from January 2010 Russia started to import natural gas from 
Azerbaijan. As reported73, the contract has not specified the maximum volumes of 
natural gas, which have to be imported to Russia. In other words, Russia is going to 
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buy as much gas as Azerbaijan is able to supply. What is more, natural gas deliveries 
had doubled and accounted for 3,00 million cubic meters per day from the 5th of 
March 201074. So, this contract has created the additional difficulties for the Nabucco 
project realization and for the EU’s desire to diversify routs of natural gas import.  
          In conclusion, I would like once again to point out on the considerable 
interconnection and influence between energy politics and foreign policy: as another 
illustration of this the new gas Azerbaijani – Russian economic partnership can be 
mentioned. As analytics of the Journal of Turkish Weekly concluded75, that the 
signing of the Protocol [on the establishing of diplomatic relations] between 
Azerbaijan and Turkey76 on the 10th of October 2010 was perceived by Azerbaijan 
that “Turkey was ignoring its brother’s interests”. The attentive eye will notice, that 
few days later (on the 14th of October 2010) the long – term contract on natural gas 
purchase and sale was signed between the RF and Azerbaijan. There is no doubt, that 
this event would create the additional problems for Nabucco project realization and 
provide other advantages for Russia in its foreign policy implementations. 
          To sum up, the Russian leadership in the world energy market is explained not 
only because the sufficient natural gas reserves, but also due to its skilful gas 
geopolitics. It is absolutely clear that the long – term contract system helps Russia to 
gain an influence over consumers and suppliers of natural gas from other countries. 
The fact that Gazprom is having exclusive right on natural gas production, 
transportation etc and that this situation is actively supported by the state – all this 
provide to the RF additional advantages on gas market. The analysis of another one 
Russian gas tactics - “pipelines strategy” I will present in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
THE GEOPOLITICS OF GAS TRANSPORTATION IN 
CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA.  
 
 
           3.1. The Struggle for Power: from Nuclear to “Pipeline” Balance of Power. 
          
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Cold War 
system, the nuclear balance of power has lost its actuality. The strategic arms 
limitation talks between the US and the RF was resulted in the signing of the Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty (hereafter, the START) on the 8th of April 2010 in Prague by 
Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama. According to the START77, each part of it 
shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms. Few days later, Dmitry Medvedev 
in the interview to the American ABC News TV – channel has expressed his position 
concerning the revival of the Cold War: “The Cold War was a boring thing. Nobody 
gets better for it. Tremendous money is wasted. Our lives get more difficult. We look 
at each other as enemies. What is good in that? In any case, I will do anything in my 
power in order to stop another Cold War, with the US or any other country in the 
world”78. These events, beyond all manner of doubt, have very positive and optimistic 
meaning: the leaders of the great powers have done and planning to do in the future 
all the possible for the arms race ending. But does it really mean that after the 
destruction of the Cold War echo the struggle for the influence in the world would 
stop? Does it signify that the RF could freely implement its foreign policy and no state 
would desire to create obstacles to it? Not definitely. In my point of view, the post – 
Cold War international system also deals with the aspiration of the states for the 
power and influence, but the means which are employed for this purpose have become 
different. I would say that in conditions when the threat of nuclear war has been 
declined significantly, the sufficiency of natural resources for a country’s future 
development and security has become much more important than the military 
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potential increasing. Natural gas, together with the its reserve’s volumes, the size of a 
country’s export capacities over domestic needs and the ability to deliver this surplus 
to its potential consumers can be classified as the strategic resource, which helps its 
owner to play an influential role on the geopolitical field. It has been already 
discussed in the previous chapters, that the RF has an obvious possibility and a clear 
desire to employ this strategically important resource for the implementing of its 
foreign policy tasks. On the other hand, it has also been pointed out earlier on the 
EU’s understandable and logical aspirations for decreasing its natural gas dependency 
from Russia. It is absolutely clear that the US (recognizing the importance of the 
Eurasian continent in the geopolitics) is not going to stand aside in this struggle for 
power and influence. Indicating the inadmissibility of the Russian gas diplomacy for 
the reason that it could create a fearful and unstable geopolitical climate in Europe, 
the US, on the one hand, are keeping up the idea of the EU’s natural gas supply 
diversification, for another hand, are encouraging the aspirations of Central Asian 
states to deliver their gas to Europe, bypassing Russia. Besides this, as some 
researchers think79, Europe’s dependency in Russian energy imports has also 
negatively resulted in the “corrosive effect” on transatlantic cooperation between the 
EU and the US (for instance, it is believed that further NATO enlargement has been 
stopped due to the strong energy ties of the RF with the wealthier Western European 
states). One of the effects of the US’s activity (in respond to all the mentioned above 
causes) has led to the active support of the Nabucco pipeline project which was 
intended to transport gas from the Central Asia and the Caspian Basin to the countries 
of Central Europe. The fact, that the RF at the same time is promoting other two 
pipeline projects to the same region can help to identify the main feature of the current 
power’ struggle in international politics, namely: arms race has been replaced by 
“pipelines race”. This “pipeline race” is not the attribute of new Cold War, but (using 
Medvedev’s definitions) as in case with the “classical” Cold War tremendous money 
will be wasted and some countries will look at each other as at enemies. And, 
definitely, it will not be “a boring thing”. 
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          This chapter will present case studies of two projected pipelines, namely: the 
Nord Stream and the South Stream. Projects’ background, as well as their 
implications and realization will be analyzed from as the steps of the Russian gas 
geopolitics in the region. In other words, this chapter will investigate if Russia is still 
available to transfer its economic, resource, geographical potentials in political.  
 
          3.2. The Nord Stream Pipeline Project. 
 
          3.2.1. Basic Project’s Characteristics. 
 
          The Nord Stream pipeline project is intended to deliver gas from the RF to the 
suppliers in the EU. It is known, that the pipeline will be build under the Baltic Sea 
from Vyborg (a town in Leningrad district in the northwestern region of Russia) to the 
place near Greifswald (a town in Mecklenburg - Western Pomerania – that is the 
northeastern part of Germany). The route of the pipeline will go through exclusive 
territorial zones and territorial waters of Russia, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and 
Finland (see Figure 16). It is planned80, that natural gas delivered to Germany, 
afterwards can be transported to the Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Denmark, the 
United Kingdom and, probably, to some other countries of the EU.  
          The resources for the projected pipeline will come from Yuzhno - Russkoye oil 
and gas reserve, and Shtokman fields and the supposed gas capacity of the pipeline is 
55,00 tcm per annum81. 
          The importance of this project for both the RF and some countries of the EU 
can be seen from the list of member – states and shareholders of Nord Stream AG (a 
joint venture company, which was organized for the project’s realization). To begin 
with its obvious member - the RF, where the project was labeled as a “transnational”82 
one. Taking into the consideration the fact concerning the state – owned controlling 
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stake, not surprisingly that Gazprom represents the RF in Nord Stream project. 
According to the information available83, the Russian gas monopolist holds a 51,0 per 
cent stake, two German companies Wintershall Holding GmbH (which is owned by 
the world’s leading chemical corporation BASF SE) and E. ON AG (a power and gas 
company) have 20,0 per cents of shares each; the last 9,0 per cents of shares belong to 
a gas infrastructure company from the Netherlands N. V. Nederlandse Gasunie.  Thus, 
the RF and Germany can be recognized as the most interested states with the mutual 
interconnected plans concerning the “Nord Stream” pipeline project. The Gazprom 
web page also added84 that Gazprom and GDF SUEZ (one of the leading energy 
suppliers from France) signed a Memorandum on additional supplies of Russian 
natural gas and on the entry of GDF SUEZ into the Nord Stream project. The 
Memorandum presumes that GDF SUEZ will receive a share of 9,0 per cent in the 
capital of Nord Stream AG. 
          According to plans85, the construction of the first line of project will take two 
years (2010 – 2011) and gas delivers from this line will start in 2011. The second line 
of the pipeline is supposed to be finished in the year 2012, and later this year the full 
capacity of the Nord Stream will be reached.  
          It is reported86 that the project is about to provide a number of advantages for 
both producer and consumers of natural gas. In my opinion, one of the most important 
is the direct “connection” between natural gas reserves in Russia and gas consumers 
in the EU. Recalling gas disputes of recent date between Ukraine and the RF and 
following interruption in the gas supply to Europe, Russia has offered to the EU’s 
member – states to minimize economic and political risks with the help of new 
pipeline, which would bypass all the current transit states. Not surprisingly, that this 
idea was enthusiastically received and supported by Germany – the largest natural gas 
importer in Europe in 2008 (see Table 4).  Generally speaking, the agreement between 
Germany and the RF concerning the pipeline can be recognized as an obviously 
successful step in the Russian gas geopolitics. It was a result of deeply interconnected 
possibilities and needs. For one thing, there are the highest needs (in the EU) for 
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natural gas in Germany. For another thing, there are the RF geographical possibilities 
(natural gas reserves and the relative nearness87 between Russia and Germany) and 
political aspirations (to decline the dependence from transit states and to preserve 
normal relations with natural gas consumers) in order to satisfy these needs. Besides 
the mentioned above obvious and logical reasons, there were a number of 
suppositions88 that such an agreement has been achieved mostly due to the friendship 
of the former Russian president Vladimir Putin and the former Chancellor of 
Germany Gerhard Schröder. Although it is possible that special close ties of two 
leaders have taken place (there is no getting away from the fact that G. Schröder was 
the person who became the chairman of the board of Nord Stream AG), the new 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel is also interested in the realization of the project. 
Despite the fact, that A. Merkel is not a Russophile as Schröder is (Merkel is known 
for her critics of Russia on number of issues), being a pragmatic politic she has 
understood that Germany can derive advantages from the pipeline project and started 
to push Nord Stream support even though that some member – states of the EU are 
protesting against it. As International Oil & Gas Newspaper reported,89 Merkel in her 
letter to European Commission President has called on all EU member – states to 
provide their full backing to the planned Nord Stream gas pipeline. Regardless of the 
accusation by some researchers in “the most shameful diplomatic union in the modern 
relations”90 which were taken place between Schröder and Putin, I would classify this 
agreement as the understandable desire of two leaders to provide to their states the 
profitable and favorable conditions for the future development, although it is true that 
such “gas relationships” has become possible due to the absence of the common EU 
energy policy which help to ignore dissatisfaction and opposition of member – states 
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of the EU and transit – states.  Similarly, this is an additional confirmation of the fact 
that Russia is applying its natural gas resources as a political as well as diplomatic 
means for “gaining” if not a friendship of Western European countries than, at least, a 
partnership. It is obvious, that Germany with its significance and influence in the EU 
was not chosen by accident – the close ties with this country is very important for the 
RF. The additional corroboration of this - the words of Dmitry Medvedev, who stated 
that “we [Russia and Germany] need to continue cooperation in energy sector, 
including the Nord Stream, as well as many other projects uniting Russia and 
Germany”91. 
          Besides the stressing the high reliability of the new route for providing secure 
gas supply to Europe, the project’s organizers also pointed out on a number of future 
positive economic effects of Nord Stream exploitation. There are92, for instance, the 
possibilities for generating a great volume of new business for various suppliers, 
including pipe mills, pipe layers, engineering companies, environmental consulting 
agencies, etc. Furthermore, presenting the Nord Stream pipeline project as a normal 
commercial one, the organizers also mentioned93 that this offshore project will cost 
15,0 per cents less than an onshore pipeline over a period of 25 years. The higher 
costs of onshore pipeline are seen as result of higher operating costs mainly. Among 
these surplus costs are: additional costs for energy, staff and maintenance of 
compressor stations needed for generating the pressure in order to transport natural 
gas through an overland pipeline94. But, there is no doubt, that the creation of impulse 
for the EU’s economic development and the possibility to economize expenses on 
15,0 per cents  are not the main goal of the Russian foreign policy, since the supposed 
investment are at level of 7,4 billion euro95. One may notice that describing the 
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advantages of the project (the direct linkage between producers in Russia and natural 
gas consumers in the EU as well as its future positive economic effects), the 
organizers pointed out on the benefit of its offshore “essence”. Broadly speaking, the 
absence of transit – states on the route can be recognized as one of the main reasons of 
the project’s existence.  
 
          3.2.2. Russia vs Eastern and Central European States. Aims vs Fears. 
 
          It can be seen from the data available (Figure 17), that the main transit routes of 
the Russian natural gas to Europe lies through Belarus and Ukraine. Outlet capacities 
of export pipelines at the Ukrainian border forms 143,0 bcm of natural gas per year 
and at the Belarusian border – 35,0 bcm per year96. The export destinations via 
Ukraine then directed Russian natural gas to 18 European countries and the pipelines 
routes through Belarus delivers gas mainly to Poland, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Belgium97. Taking into consideration the degree of natural gas dependency of 
European countries from the Russian natural gas (see Tables 5a and 5b), it becomes 
understandable why the recent gas interruptions on the Ukrainian or Belarusian 
borders are generally recognized as the threatening to European energy security. 
Besides this, the authorities of the RF also understand that such interruptions harm 
country’ reputation as a reliable supplier. In addition to the losses in political sphere, 
Russia has incurred significant economic losses. According to figures available at the 
web page of the Prime Minister of the RF98, only in the last “gas war” between Russia 
and Ukraine, the losses in the first week of January 2009 were about 40,0 million US 
$ and from the 7th of January Russia loosed 120,0 million US $ per day. Taking into 
account the fact, that the conflict was resolved on January 19 2009 only99, the total 
losses of Gazprom were 1,48 billion USD.  Not surprisingly, that Russia is trying to 
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reduce its dependency from transit – countries and looking for other gas routes to 
Europe. In order to decline the possible negative outcomes in this respect for the RF, 
Russia’s officials have even decided not to build (at least in the nearest future) the 
additional line of the Yamal – Europe gas pipeline, even though the infrastructure for 
this new line has already been constructed in Belarus. Expressing the official position 
of the RF, Dmitry Medvedev in the interview to Belarusian media mentioned about 
two reasons why the more expensive the Nord Stream pipeline project has been 
chosen. The first mentioned cause is the logical and justifiable unwillingness to be 
dependent from any political upheaval or national instability of transit – states.100 
Furthermore, as the main reason Medvedev diplomatically pointed out on the 
necessity of “convenience for all European consumers” and “guaranteed fulfillment of 
our obligations”. True, that the satisfaction of the European natural gas consumers is 
very important for the RF’s revenues, but it is hard to imagine that Russia would 
undertake some project if it would not respond country’s interests. And the answer 
has come from this very interview: “the more opportunities for supplying Russian gas 
to Europe are offered, the better it will be” and if the demand for gas in Europe would 
increase, Russia is ready to discuss other ideas, including the additional line to the 
Yamal – Europe pipeline. Thus, it can be interpreted that if Russia would realize that 
some other projects could bring additional economic and/or political advantages, it 
would definitely undertake it even with transit – states as partners101. In my point of 
view, the choice of the Nord Stream project is explained by the fact, that at this 
moment the RF is more interested in new Western European market conquest since 
Eastern European countries (Belarus, Ukraine, and the Baltic States) are already 100,0 
per cents dependent from the Russian natural gas (see Table 5a and Figure 17). An 
illustration of Western European sense of purpose of the RF is the fact that Gazprom 
has already signed agreements for the delivery of some 22,00 bcm of natural gas to 
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consumers from the year 2011102. Although it is not very big volumes, nevertheless 
(as the Russian natural gas expansion achievement) I would like to mention the 
agreements which have been signed with the companies from Denmark and the 
United Kingdom103 – countries which did not import natural gas from Russia (at least 
in the year 2006) (see Table 5a). 
          Logically, that transit – states do not supports the Russian initiative for other 
pipeline development. On the one hand, the revenues of these countries for gas 
infrastructure using will decrease if the RF will not use capacities of existing pipelines 
on the possible maximum. On the other hand, the main threat for transit – states is 
seen in the growing opportunity for the RF to use the “gas top” as the means for 
political and economic influence.  
          Even though the Nord Stream pipeline project was recognized104 as a part of the 
Trans – European Energy Networks and one of the priority energy projects of 
European interest, there is also a group of the EU’s member - states (for instance, the 
Baltic states and Poland) who due special historical relations with Russia in the past  
are suspicious about the new steps in the gas geopolitics of the RF. Broadly speaking, 
politicians and researchers in these countries do not agree with the statement that the 
Nord Stream pipeline is about to provide as much Russian natural gas to Europe as 
possible, but rather to increase the Russian (and German) influences in the region. A 
professor from Lithuania considers105 that the new pipeline is undesirable for the 
number of reasons. Firstly, it brings fears about increasing pressure of Gazprom 
through the price of natural gas. Then, Nord Stream deflates hope about the possibility 
to become a gas transit country (and, consequently, to receive additional budget 
revenues). What is more, this project has lead to the clash between the Western and 
Eastern European states. In addition to these reasons, the Estonian Parliament 
“expressed serious concern over the possible environmental fallout from the Nord 
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Stream gas project and said it should not be allowed to go ahead”106. What is more, 
one Latvian spokesperson disagreeing with the pipeline construction, mentioned that 
constructing a pipeline which could go through the Baltic states to Germany would 
have cost 2,2 billion euros whereas the idea to build the pipeline under the Baltic Sea 
will be almost 3,4 times as expensive107. The position of the Polish Foreign Minister 
Radosław Sikorski who has said that the Nord Stream project echoed the 1939 
Molotov - Ribbentrop Pact I have already mentioned in the chapter 2 of the thesis. 
Notwithstanding all these facts, it is clear that neither Poland nor the Baltic states do 
not have any visible opportunities to create obstacles to the new pipeline for the 
reason that older and more prosperous member – states are more influential in 
upholding their national interests (including keeping their economies supplied with 
natural gas). It is obvious that the RF’s authorities understand that as well and tries to 
win the key states over to its side. How successful Russia was in its strivings can be 
acknowledged from the fact that all the states through which exclusive economic 
zones and territorial waters the pipeline will go through (Finland, Sweden and 
Denmark) has approved the construction of the pipeline. And, finally, the construction 
of the Nord Stream began on April 4, 2010108. 
 
          3.2.3. The Possible Development of Events. 
 
          There is no doubt, that not only politicians but also a number of researchers are 
analyzing the possible outcomes from the pipeline construction. Most of them believe 
that the diversification of the Russian pipeline network was not intended for the 
increasing of European energy security but for pressing on countries of Eastern and 
Central Europe. Edward Lucas, for example, considers109 that since the existing 
pipelines to Germany go through Belarus and Poland on the north and through 
Ukraine, Slovakia and the Czech Republic on the south, Russia does not want to be 
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dependent from these countries in its relations with Germany. In other words, if the 
RF would decide to “punish” any of these countries, this decision would influence and 
more important for Russia western consumers. Similarly, Lucas supposes that the 
Nord Stream pipeline construction would provide the additional convenience to apply 
the favorite Kremlin’s policy “to divide - and - conquer”.  
          In addition to this, analytics of East European Gas Analysis110 center provide 
their suppositions about the future Russian plans in respect of pipeline’ using in the 
year 2020 with mathematical computation. Thus, according to calculations (see Table 
6), the existing pipelines together with Nord Stream will make possible to cut off gas 
deliveries to Poland and Belarus (which are predicted to be at level of 128,00 bcm per 
day in January 2020) without any disturbances in gas supply for other European 
countries. Besides this, as researchers of East European Gas Analysis believe, Russia 
could also have in mind to punish Germany by blocking the Nord Stream route. 
Interestingly, that Ukraine is supposed to stay one of the most important transit routes 
for Russia even if all the projected pipelines would be put into operation. First of all, 
in a case of conflicts with Belarus and Poland, Russia would need to increase export 
to Central European countries with the help of Ukrainian gas infrastructure (from 
300,0 to 428,0 bcm per day in January 2020). Secondly, in order to provide 
uninterrupted supply to Europe, Russia also would need to ensure the sufficient 
amounts of natural gas in underground gas storage facilities in Ukraine (about 158,0 
bcm a day in January 2010). Similarly, the gas future of Ukraine can be classified as 
more or less favorable in comparison with Belarus and Poland. 
          While I agree that the ramified natural gas pipeline network provides a unique 
opportunity to press on Central and Eastern European countries, nevertheless I think 
that the statement that Russia is going to employ it on every occasion and towards all 
the dependent countries is wrong. As the first confirmation of my opinion I would like 
to point out on the obvious fact, namely: the authorities of Russia clearly understand 
that manipulations with gas taps will be reflected in the budget revenues declining 
since the RF exports the significant amounts of natural gas to Europe and receives the 
considerable amounts of takings111.  
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          Moreover, the regular using of “gas tap” will not be favorable to the future 
economic and political relations between Russia and European countries inasmuch as 
Russia is pretending to be a reliable partner not only in natural gas exporting but in 
other spheres as well.  
          Besides this, the EU’s desire for natural gas import diversification together with 
the rising interests in shale gas producing in Europe will considerably decline the 
opportunity for Russia to use its natural gas reserves as the geopolitical lever and will 
definitely decrease the Russian influence in the global energy balance. As reported112, 
energy giants such as ExxonMobil and Royal Dutch Shell snap up licenses in a 
number of countries (France, Sweden, Poland, and Germany) to explore for shale. If 
Gazprom before rejected to admit that the discovery of substantial shale gas reserves 
could influence the energy power of Russia, now the Natural Resources Minister Yuri 
Trutnev in the interview has said the following: “We have a problem with shale gas. 
This is not only my position, but the position of Gazprom as well”113.  
          Additionally, I suppose that the probability of the recurrent gas disputes 
repeating with Ukraine (and, consequently, of interruptions of gas supply to this 
country and then to Europe) has been reduced with the election of Viktor Yanukovich 
as a President of Ukraine, who is supposed to be a pro – Russian politician (at least, at 
first glance). It is widely accepted114 that Russia from the very beginning has used the 
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Gazprom monopoly to exert political pressure on Ukraine because of the rejection by 
the Russian officials of the Ukrainian foreign policy’ aspirations under the guidance 
of the former President Viktor Yushchenko (for example, the issues about the possible 
Ukrainian membership in NATO and other aspects of West - oriented “orange 
revolution’s directions).  
          Furthermore, in all likelihood the tense relations between Russia and other its 
frequent opponent Poland could become better in the nearest future. As the reasons 
for this possible improvement three recent events can be mentioned. Firstly, it is the 
participation of the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in the ceremony which 
was held in memory of the Katyn massacre in April 2010 (it is known that the issue of 
not - acknowledged responsibility for the massacre by the Russian’ officials has been 
one of the obstacles for the relation’s improvement between the states). Secondly, the 
relations between two states could be improved due to the fact that they are expected 
to finalize an agreement on April 2010 for extending its current gas supply contract 
until 2037 and increase its maximum import volumes via the Yamal pipeline almost 
on 4,6 times115. However, some analytics believe116, that the mentioned above two 
events were just a result of another steps of the Russian gas geopolitics, namely: the 
desire to fix the relations with Poland because of growing awareness of Poland's 
potential shale gas reserves for the Russian energy dominance in the region. There 
was also another event, which is hardly connected with the probably means of the 
Russian gas geopolitics – the plane crash on April 4th, 2010, killing 96 people abroad 
including the President of Poland Lech Kaczyński. I think that a sympathetic response 
by the RF’s officials and common citizens of Russia to the Polish air force crash near 
by Smolensk could significantly improve the relations between two states. A 
confirmation of this is a quote from a Polish newspaper: “Russia's behavior after the 
tragedy in Smolensk totally contradicts the thesis of those who claim that closer 
relations between Russia and Poland are impossible”117.   
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          Lastly, I would not agree with the mentioned above conclusion of East 
European Gas Analysis centre, which stated that Russia could easily manipulate 
Germany by blocking the Nord Stream route without any disturbances to other 
European states. Personally, I think that Russia would not risk worsening the relations 
with such a considerable and influential country not only in the EU but in the world. 
After, the RF in all probability would not desire to interrupt the newly founded gas 
importers, namely: Denmark and the United Kingdom (where, as supposed, natural 
gas will be transported from Germany).  
          Analyzing the current situation connected with the Nord Stream advancement 
and construction, it can be said that the Nord Stream pipeline is significant success in 
the Russian geopolitical aspirations.  
 
          3.3. The South Stream Pipeline Project. 
 
          3.3.1. Basic Project’s Characteristics. 
 
          The South Stream pipeline is another one project promoted by the RF and 
which was intended to deliver natural gas to the suppliers in Europe (to countries in its 
Central and Southern part). The onshore part of the pipeline will start at the 
Beregovaya compressor station which is located in the Southern federal district of 
Russia; at the Black Sea cost (this part of the pipeline has been already finalized118). 
Then it will run under the sea and finish near the port of Varna at the Bulgarian cost. 
It is planned that two possible routes will go afterwards from Bulgaria to north and 
south (see Figures 18 and 19). In order to implement onshore section of the pipeline 
outside the RF, five intergovernmental agreements have been already signed between 
Russia and natural gas importers in Europe, namely: Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, 
Greece, Slovenia and Austria119. According to these agreements, joint ventures will be 
established in order to carry out feasibility studies, and later construct and operate 
onshore section of pipeline in each participating country. Not surprisingly, that these 
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agreements stipulate that Gazprom will hold no less than 50,0 per cents of shares in 
every joint venture. Besides this, the agreement with Romania is under negotiations. 
The beginning of cooperation with Romania can be classified as another one 
undoubted strategic success of Russia in its gas geopolitics. It is known, that Romania 
has been a strong supporter of the Nabucco pipeline project and categorically opposed 
the South Stream project, but the situation has changed since the year 2010. It was 
reported120, that on February this year Romania has confirmed its interest in the South 
Stream pipeline project and has passed to Gazprom all the documents with essential 
data which were necessary to draft a feasibility study of the gas pipeline's route 
through Romania. Afterwards, in late April 2010 the Minister of Economy of 
Romania Adriean Videanu announced121 that South Stream pipeline would pass via 
Romania.  Additionally to the routes mentioned above, it is also supposed that 
offshore gas pipelines could lay under the Adriatic Sea as well in order to supply 
Southern Italy region122.  
          It has been claimed123 that the raw base for the projected pipeline will come 
from the Russian natural gas infrastructure, but the source base will consists of the 
Russian gas as well of gas which Russia is buying in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. 
          According to the plan, the pipeline’s capacity will reach the level of 63,00 bcm 
per annum, the total length of the offshore’ part will last for 900,0 kilometers; and the 
construction is planned to be finished in the year 2015 only124. Meantime, a feasibility 
study of the project’s offshore part is taking part in Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Serbia. The investment part is planned to start as the feasibility studies are finished125. 
It is expected, that the overall investments into the project will be around 10,0 billion 
US $126. 
                                                 
120
 “Gazprom Receives South Stream Documents from Romania”, RIA Novosti, 17 Feb. 2010, 29 Apr. 
2010 <http://en.rian.ru/business/20100217/157919807.html>. 
121
 Marian Chirac, “South Stream Pipeline Will Pass through Romania”, Balkaninsight.com, 23 Apr. 
2010, 29 Apr. 2010 <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/27589/>. 
122
 “Gas Pipeline Route”, South Stream, 25 Apr. 2010 <http://south-
stream.info/index.php?id=10&L=1>. 
123
 “Projekt Gazoprovoda “Juzhnyj Potok“. Spravka” [The South Stream Pipeline Project. The 
Information”], RIA Novosti, 24 Apr. 2010, 25 Apr. 2010 
<http://www.rian.ru/spravka/20100424/226289258.html>. 
124
 “Facts and Figures”, South Stream, 25 Apr. 2010 <http://south-stream.info/index.php?id=14&L=1>. 
125
 “5 Questions about “South Stream”, South Stream, 25 Apr. 2010 <http://south-
stream.info/index.php?id=30&L=1>. 
126
 “Projekt Gazoprovoda “Juzhnyj Potok“. Spravka” [The South Stream Pipeline Project. The 
Information”], RIA Novosti, 24 Apr. 2010, 25 Apr. 2010 
<http://www.rian.ru/spravka/20100424/226289258.html>. 
Chapter 3. The Geopolitics of Gas Transportation in Contemporary Russia 
 59 
          The project was initiated by the RF and Italy. The latter country is known as 
one of the world’ largest natural gas consumers (see Table 2), the second largest gas 
importer in the EU (see Table 4) with almost one third of natural gas imported from 
Russia (see table 5a). Besides this, Italy is another one country in Western Europe 
which enjoys special relations with Russia. It is known about a friendship between the 
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Silvio Berlusconi – the Prime Minister of 
Italy, another one influential country of the EU (together with Germany and France). 
Thanks to this friendship the Russian – Italian economic ties began develop rapidly. It 
was reported127, that Italy started buying more gas from the RF during Berlusconi's 
stay at power. The Russian part of the project is logically represented by Gazprom, 
the Italian part – by Eni S. p. A firm (an integrated multinational energy company, 
which also was a partner of Russia in the Blue Stream pipeline construction). Each 
partner has 50,0 per cents of the shares in a joint venture South Stream AG, which 
was organized for the project’s realization. Furthermore, the participation of other 
firms is agreed, but their share will be distributed on the onshore parts of the 
pipeline128. It is already known129 that Gazprom and Eni S. p. A has agreed that the 
French energy company EdF would become another one shareholder of the joint 
venture and would receive 20,0 per cents of shares. It is expected, that the 
negotiations between all the interested parts will be finalized in the signing of a 
trilateral treaty at the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum, which will take 
part on June, 17 – 19, 2010. 
          Explaining the necessity of the pipeline’s construction, the pipeline’s web page 
presents130 number of (I would say, traditionally positive) opinions of politics and 
government officials from the RF and European countries. There is, for instance, the 
desire of all the participating states to satisfy Europe’s rising demand of gas, to 
diversify gas flows and to increase energy security in Europe. Besides this, there is 
also a remark about the significant opportunity for involved states to stimulate their 
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economies development by creating jobs and revenues from gas transit fees131. 
Definitely, the economic interests are very important, but it is much more interesting 
to investigate which geopolitical tasks Russia is having, promoting the construction of 
the South Stream pipeline.   
 
          3.3.2. The South Stream Pipeline Project as the Additional Step to Become the 
Lord of the Rings. The Gas Rings. 
 
          Clearly, that in the current world the economic interests are dependent from the 
geopolitical ambitions. This was already seen on the example of the Nord Stream 
pipeline project: the construction of the new offshore pipeline is much more 
expensive than using the already existed additional line of Yamal – Europe pipeline or 
building the new onshore one through the Baltic States. The pretty much the same is 
the situation around the South Stream pipeline. There is a possibility to “add” 
supplementary onshore lines to the existed Blue Stream pipeline, which is transiting 
the Russian natural gas directly to Turkey (see Figure 17). The Blue Stream starts 
from the Beregovaya compressor station (the same point of departure is planned for 
the South Stream pipeline) and goes across the Black Sea. Moreover, according to the 
Gazprom website132, this gas transmission corridor is ready for using for other 
projects’ implementing, but as a likely destination the countries of the Middle East 
and Israel are considered. Probably, these new routes also will not come into the 
reality because of the Russian unwillingness to be dependent from Turkey, which 
could become a transit – country in this case. Although the current Russian – Turkish 
cooperation (especially in the energy sector and trade) is developing dynamically133, it 
is still possible that existing relations could getting worse if the issues concerning the 
competition for influence between two states in Central Asia and/or Caucasus would 
become actual.  In my point of view, the construction of new South Stream pipeline 
shows a clear desire of Russia to compete with another one pipeline in the region – 
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Nabucco, although Vladimir Zubkov (First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia and 
Board of Directors Chairman in Gazprom) has stated that “Russia stands for 
diversification of gas flows to Europe and doesn’t regard Nabucco as a competitor to 
the South Stream and the Nord Stream”134. But it does not seem like that. It is 
known135, that the Nabucco pipeline project has to connect almost the same regions as 
the South Stream project, namely: the Caspian region, Middle East and Egypt via 
Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary with Austria and go further on with the Central 
and Western European gas markets (see Figure 19). It is obvious that two pipelines in 
the same regions would be competitive. And the question is not only in the struggle of 
two joint ventures for resources, consumers on the same markets, and for the possible 
prices and profits. It is much more about the geopolitical influence in the regions in 
which Russia is very interested. It is not a secret that after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and the Warsaw Pact’ failure Russia has lost its political influence and 
leadership in the region and since then is attempting to recover its position in the FSU 
countries, as well as in the former satellites in the Communist camp. For Russia it is 
principally to be the first in the pipeline construction, because it provides a great 
opportunity to “lock” producers of natural gas in the Central Asia and consumers in 
Europe by the long – term contracts, and to the certain extent to influence these 
countries’ politics. In my view, the very existence and the further operation of the 
pipeline in this region is seen by Russia as the means for strengthening its positions 
and influencing the balance of powers in addition to the Nord Stream pipeline project. 
Literary speaking, it gives a chance for the RF to put Europe inside its natural gas 
ring.  
           In order to fulfill this task, Russia has already undertaken a number of steps. To 
begin with the attempts for ensuring stable resource base for the new pipeline. The 
idea to fill the pipeline with the natural gas from the Central Asian region will help 
Russia to gain additional economic and (geo)political advantages. Firstly, it will help 
Russia to increase the share of natural gas from the Russian gas infrastructure at the 
global energy market. At the same time, the RF will have a chance to decline the 
possibility for Europe to buy natural gas directly at the countries of Central Asia and 
Kazakhstan (natural gas from this region is supposed to fill the competing Nabucco 
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pipeline): according to the information available136, the gas purchases of Russia in 
Central Asian region raised on 3,7 times for the period from 2005 to 2008 (similarly, 
it could become possible that there will not be enough gas in the nearest future in 
order to fill the Nabucco pipeline). Besides this, being a landlocked countries, 
Kazakhstan and Central Asian countries has become more dependent from Russia as 
their significant natural gas importer. In addition to this, the long – term gas purchase 
and cooperation agreements are in place with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. These agreements envisage gas’ deliveries to Russia, but 
also provide an opportunity for Russia to work on the geological survey of subsurface 
resources in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and to obtain two subsurface use licenses of 
gas areas in Kyrgyzstan137. The economic benefit of these steps is clear as well: the 
more gas Russia sells after at the global energy market the more revenues it gains. On 
the whole, it can be said that Russia was quite successful at the first stage of project.  
          Even though a number of European leaders (as Angela Merkel, Silvio 
Berlusconi and others138) have stressed the importance and necessity of the South 
Stream pipeline construction, the project is still lacking the status of the project of the 
European interest (it is not a part of the TEN – E). The status means that a project is 
acknowledged as an important one for sustainability and security of energy supply in 
Europe and, consequently, has to be supported by the entire EU member – states. 
What is more important, the projects, which are supported by the EU’s member – 
states involved, can be nominated for the financial support’ receiving from the 
Community budget. As reported139, the financial aid can come through the following 
sources, namely: the TEN - budget line, the Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund. 
Additionally, the European Investment Bank has also greatly contributed to the 
financing of these projects through loans. Logically, that without such a status South 
Stream can be nominally considered as a project of interest of their shareholders only 
(Russia, Italy, and from the summer this year - France). Not surprisingly, that the 
shareholders are attempting to gain as much support to the project as possible. Trying 
to achieve this strategic goal, the Gazprom’ and Eni’ heads have decided to repeat the 
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“maneuver” with Gerhard Schröder’ hiring and offered to Romano Prodi the post of 
the Chairman of the South Stream pipeline project, but R. Prodi has refused this 
suggestion. There is no doubt, that if R. Prodi (the former Prime Minister of Italy and 
President of the European Commission) would accept this offer, he could have done a 
lot for the South Stream pipeline promotion. Suffering a reverse with this 
appointment, Russia is trying to provide the support to the project from all other 
possible routes. It is known, for example, that the intergovernmental agreements 
between Russia and the EU’s member – states, participating in the South Stream 
pipeline project, are declaring that “parts [of the project] are going to undertake all the 
possible efforts for the receiving the status of the TEN’s project in order to use all the 
advantages which such projects are experiencing”140. Probably those efforts of the 
European countries will bear desirable fruits in the nearest future, because Günther 
Oettinger, the European Commissioner for Energy in the European Commission has 
noted  at an energy forum in Bulgaria that “South Stream will increase the capacity 
for gas imports [to Europe] and set up a new infrastructure supply network” and due 
to this reason the “South Stream could be backed by the European Commission on 
condition that it meets the technical requirements for security”141. At the same time, 
these words of the European Commissioner could not have been perceived by the RF 
in a very positive way as an opportunity to gain advantages in comparison with its 
rival project. The reason for this opinion is another one statement of Günther 
Oettinger, which he has pronounced at the forum, namely: the EU could also lend its 
support to Nabucco project because of the growing energy demand in the EU142. 
Personally, I think that the receiving of the South Stream pipeline project the status of 
the TEN’s project could face up with the opposition of a number of the EU’s member 
– states seeking to reduce the dependency from the Russian natural gas deliveries. 
There always will be the states which would prefer the diversification of supply from 
different countries to the diversification of routes of the Russian natural gas and which 
would be against the control of supply by the RF. The only possible way for Russia is 
to enlist the aid to its project from the most powerful states of the EU, which are 
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really interested in the increasing natural gas deliveries. At the same time, it is 
obvious that the lack of the status of TEN’s project does not restrain the RF from the 
strategic plans’ implementation (to ensure its national interest with the help of energy 
resources). The decisiveness and assertiveness of the Russian officials to put this idea 
into practice can be confirmed with the recent words of V. Putin who mentioned: “We 
[Russia] intend to realize this project no matter what”143. 
          Although it can be said that the RF was quite successful in promoting its 
strategic interest and already has got the essential support from Germany and Italy, 
nonetheless Russia has also faced up with the some difficulties in the mutual 
understanding with the Italian partner which has been resulted in the sharp objections 
from the Russian side. For instance, Stanislav Tsygankov, the head of the external 
economic activity department of Gazprom, describing at the beginning of April 2010 
the perspectives of the South Stream pipeline project’ development, recognized de 
facto the actual state of affairs as problematic. Moreover, he mentioned that the Italian 
partner was blocking the development of events: owing to the lack of the proper work 
from the Italian part, the progress of the offshore part of the South Stream project was 
recognized by him as insignificant. According to S. Tsygankov144, Eni (which is 
responsible for the offshore section construction) does not want to get an agreement 
on working programs or even on fulfilled researches. What is more, the Italian side 
has not paid for anything yet, while the Russian part has covered all the expenses. The 
reason for such a serious dissatisfaction from Russia was the speech of Paolo Skaroni 
(the Chief Executive officer of Eni S. p. A.) during which he has called for merging of 
the South Stream and Nabucco pipeline projects and explained it as a “strategic fit” 
for all interested parts, because it would help to “reduce investments, operational costs 
and increase overall returns”145. Even though P. Skarponi has mentioned about the 
economic motive (the desire to economize expenses and to gain as much profit as 
possible), this proposal definitely was heard by the Russian partners as one with the 
political meaning (since the natural gas pipeline construction always has the political 
implication). Not surprisingly, that Russia is skeptical (if not to say exasperated) 
about this idea. As the first explanation of this I would like to mention the evident 
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desire of the RF to gain the considerable geopolitical power and weight in Europe 
with the help of its energy resources. Consequently, Russia will obviously avoid the 
situation and admit the proposal which could decrease or, what is more – destroy the 
Russian foreign policy aspirations. Reacting on the suggestion of P. Skarponi, Energy 
Minister of the RF Sergei Shmatko has noticed, that these issues were not discussed at 
all. Furthermore, “Russia isn’t considering merging its South Stream gas pipeline to 
Europe with the rival European Union - backed Nabucco link”146. The irritation from 
the unacceptable and inadmissible terms of this offer for the RF was so obvious, that 
during the interview S. Shmatko has called two natural gas projects as “rival”, than 
that they are “far from being competitors” and, at the same time, he firmly established 
that South Stream “is more competitive” than Nabucco. As the second explanation of 
the Russian refuse I would mention the fact that Nabucco is supported not only by the 
EU but the USA as well and was intended in order to stop the natural gas monopoly of 
the RF in Europe. Consequently, the Russian participation in the combined common 
pipeline’ construction is impossible to imagine, because Russia (using the rhetoric of 
the Foreign Policy Concept of the RF) will not agree with what is seen as the EU’s 
and mainly America’s desire to limit the Russian interests as “one of influential 
centers in the modern world” at reaching economic, political and geopolitical goals 
and will definitely try to overcome “continued political and psychological policy of 
“containing” Russia”. The contradiction between the sides about the South Stream 
pipeline project’ future could have led to the protracted conflict which further could 
have continued in the search of new partners or even in the material changes in the 
realization of the whole project if the recurrent strategic success of Russia had not 
occurred. This happened a month later when the Russian Prime Minister paid a 
working visit to Italy to discuss cooperation in science and energy (including the 
issues on the South Stream pipeline project). During his visit V. Putin, commenting 
the disagreement between the Italian and Russian sides, has confirmed147 that there 
were no delays in South Stream implementation. Moreover, the Russian – language 
version of the same report about Putin’s visit to Italy even called this discrepancy 
                                                 
146
 Anna Shiryaevskaya, “Russia Rejects Eni Call to Merge Europe Gas Pipelines”, Bloomberg.com, 15 
Mar. 2010, 26 Apr. 2010 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ae4.eb4lPqjk>. Italics mine. 
147
 “No Delays in South Stream Implementation – Russia’s Putin”, RIA Novosti, 26 Apr. 2010, 26 Apr. 
2010 <http://en.rian.ru/world/20100426/158754245.html>. 
Chapter 3. The Geopolitics of Gas Transportation in Contemporary Russia 
 66 
about inter - company problems between Gazprom and Eni as ostensible148, 
“forgetting” a very eloquent speech of S. Shmatko in the twinkling of en eye.  
          In comparison with persistent and stubborn efforts of Russia for the success of 
the South Stream pipeline project realization, the Nabucco project is experiencing 
much more problem. To begin with the fact that Gazprom policy to conclude long – 
term binding agreements and to pre – empt at market prices as much Turkmen and 
Azeri gas as possible has lead to the situation when the source base for the Nabucco 
has become questionable.  Additionally, some critics have asserted149 that the project 
has at least another two restraining moments. Firstly, its protracted preliminary stage 
which has been lasting for ten years already. Secondly, it is a complicated ownership 
structure of Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH when each of six shareholders 
holds an equal share of 16,67 per cents and no one seems to be an obvious leader of 
the project. What is more, Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger has said150 
recently that Nabucco would come into operation in 2018 at the earliest. 
Consequently, the South Stream pipeline project (in comparison with Nabucco) can 
be recognized as the project with every prospect of success.  
          To sum up, Gregory R. Copley151 in his analysis of the current situation has 
noted152 that Moscow was currently in the ascendant and pointed out on the entirely 
new dynamic in Eastern Mediterranean and South - East European strategic affairs. 
According to him, the world has discovered itself “in a period and a region in which 
Russia, not the West, is taking the key initiatives and has much of the advantage”. 
Continuing to evaluate the situation, G. R. Copley has surprisingly lamented that 
Russian foreign policymaking receives insufficient attention in US and other Western 
media, and “remains as opaque to Western analysts as it was during the Cold War era 
when Russia was veiled by an Iron Curtain”. I would allow myself to contradict to the 
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last statement of the expert. In my point of view, it is hard to accuse the RF in the 
“disguising” of its (geo)politic’ plans, aspirations and the “weapons” it is going to use 
in order to achieve its aims: the better confirmation of my word are texts of the 
Concept, Energy and Security Strategies of the RF, which I have already quoted in the 
first two chapters of the thesis. What would be more clear and distinct than words: 
“The global character of energy problems and their continually rising politicization, as 
well as the influential position of the Russian energy complex in the world energy 
system have pushed the energy factor to the place of basic elements of the Russian 
diplomacy”153? 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
          The overview of the main principles of realist and neorealist theories (such as 
national interests, security, and power politics) and categories used in The Foreign 
Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, The National Strategy of the Russian 
Federation until 2020 and The Energy Strategy of Russia until 2020 has corroborated 
my idea that neo(realism) has shaped the foreign and security policies of Russia. To 
begin with the confirmation that the RF definitely sees itself as a great power, namely: 
as a country with the visible role in international affairs, the significant responsibility 
for global world developments and the obvious possibilities and desire to take an 
active part in the formulating as well as in the development of international agenda. 
Declared itself as a great power, the Russian officials have logically pointed out on 
the aspirations to protect its current position and take part in the struggle for power 
with the “historic West” in order to protect state’s national interests. The special 
attention in this respect Russia is paying to its natural resources, which are seen, on 
the one hand, as one of the most influential levers in the foreign policy 
implementation (the state is not only planning to increase the potential of the fuel and 
energy industries to support its reputation as a reliable partner, but also is going to 
promote the development of own economy and diversify country’s presence on the 
world markets). At the same time, understanding the conditions of uneven distribution 
of natural resources in the world, Russia, for another hand, determines its natural 
resources as the tool for security goal realizations. Among the main security tasks 
articulated by Russia are the necessity to maintain the control over its national 
resources (through the preservation of state monopoly in the gas sector, for instance) 
and overcome the discrimination against the RF on the regional and world energy 
markets. On the whole, the role of Russia in world energy supply is viewed as a 
means for ensuring state’s foreign policy independence and the state is going to use 
this lever notwithstanding of the other countries which were characterized by the 
Minister of the Foreign Affairs of the RF as “unhappy about a strong Russia”. 
          The examination of the situation on the international natural gas market has 
demonstrated the objective nature of the RF to rely on its natural gas possessions for 
its strategic aims’ achieving: the natural gas reserves of Russia at end of 2008 
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constituted 23,4 per cents from total world reserves and, consequently, yielded the 
first position for the country. In addition to this, Russia (at the same year) was 
recognized as the leader in natural gas producing and exporting, and one of the largest 
(after the US) consumers of natural gas. All these numbers would have meant nothing 
if only Russia had not had the advantageous geographical and geopolitical positions 
and had not been surrounded by countries and regions with insignificant gas reserves 
and continually and dramatically rising natural gas consumption. But in the reality the 
country is claimed to be the main importer of the number of the FSU and the EU 
countries. For instance, almost a half from 27 countries of the EU in the year 2006 can 
be recognized as highly dependent (Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary 
and Romania) and as fully dependent (Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Finland, 
Greece and Slovakia) from the Russian natural gas. Not surprisingly, that the recent 
interruptions in the gas supply because of the gas disputes between Russia and some 
transit – states have clarified for the EU the necessity to diversify suppliers, transport 
routes and transport mechanisms (as it was stated, for example, in The 2006 Green 
Paper – a European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy). 
Nevertheless, I believe that the absence of the common European strategy (with the 
common opinion on the energy questions) because of the disagreement between the 
member – states about the attitude towards Russia as one of the principal suppliers of 
the EU, has make the RF relatively free in implementing its geopolitical interests with 
the help of energy means. In my point of view, the absolute freedom for Russia in this 
respect is impossible due to the fact that the US also sees the Eurasian region as the 
sphere of their geopolitical interests and recognizes the natural resources possessions 
and the ability to deliver export volumes of these resources to potential consumers as 
the strategic means, which help its owner to play an influential role on the geopolitical 
field. For these reasons, the US are supporting idea of the EU’s natural gas supply 
diversification and encouraging the aspirations of Central Asian states to deliver gas 
to Europe, bypassing Russia (the mentioned above activities were resulted in the 
support of the rival Nabucco project). Logically, that in responds to this the RF has 
attempted a number of steps in order to protect its interests in this sphere. As the 
obviously successful move of the Russian geopolitics I would like to mention the long 
– term natural gas purchase contracts, signed between the RF and Turkmenistan and 
Azerbaijan (which are supposed to be suppliers of the Nabucco pipeline). These 
contracts, for one thing, offer the market price for Turkmen and Azerbaijani gas, and 
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for another thing, have not specified the maximum volume of natural gas, which have 
to be imported to Russia (from Azerbaijan). There is no doubt, that these measures 
will help Russia not only to increase the share of natural gas from the Russian gas 
infrastructure at the global energy market, but also to create some kind of long - term 
problems to the Nabucco project with the source base. Additionally, declaring the 
similar unwillingness to be dependent from the transit – states in its relationships with 
natural gas consumers, Russia on the EU’s demand for diversification of natural gas 
routes, has presented two new pipeline projects, namely: the Nord Stream and the 
South Stream. Broadly speaking, the already established interaction between energy 
resources and international politics supplemented by the fact, that three rival pipelines 
are supposed to be constructed to the same (European) region make it possible to 
classify the modern power’ struggle as the era of pipeline race.    
          The research of the Nord Stream and South Stream pipeline projects has shown 
that Russia was pursuing a number of goals. Firstly, there is a desire to decline its 
dependence from transit - states (to create the direct connection between natural gas 
reserves in Russia and gas consumers in the EU). This goal will help to both parts in 
minimizing the sufficient political and economic risks and in receiving future positive 
economic effects (as, for instance, the opportunity to generate new businesses in this 
field). These aims can be classified as “declared” and official ones. Although they are 
definitely seen by Russia as important, but there are a number of others, which are not 
articulated openly. To begin with the desire of the RF to establish better relationships 
with Germany, Italy (and France) which are widely recognized as the wealthiest and 
most influential countries of the EU. Understanding the fact, that these countries are 
interested in the increasing of natural gas delivers and that through the system of 
bilateral mutually advantageous agreements these countries can gain considerable 
benefits in the region (even though some other countries are against of it), Russia has 
successfully negotiated the participation of the leading energy, chemical companies 
from Germany, Italy and France in the pipeline projects. Moreover, the enlisted 
support for its projects from such influential politicians as Silvio Berlusconi, Angela 
Merkel and Gerhard Schröder can be mentioned as the another one “victory” of the 
Russian gas geopolitics. In addition to this, how successful Russia was in its gas 
strategic aspirations can be acknowledged from the fact that all the states through 
which EEZ and territorial waters the Nord Stream pipeline will go through (Finland, 
Sweden and Denmark) have approved the construction of the pipeline. Furthermore, 
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in the framework of the Nord Stream pipeline project, Russia is putting its 
expansionist’s idea into practice: the gas purchase agreements have been signed with 
companies from the United Kingdom and Denmark (new directions for the Russian 
natural gas export routes). While analyzing the South Stream pipeline project, the 
beginning of cooperation with Romania I would identify as another one undoubted 
strategic success of Russia in its gas geopolitics. Despite the fact, that Romania has 
been a strong supporter of the Nabucco pipeline project and categorically opposed the 
South Stream project, in late April 2010 there was an announcement that South 
Stream pipeline would pass via Romania.  
          At the same time, it cannot be said that Russia is absolutely lucky in its policy’ 
implementing and all the countries in Europe are supporting the development of the 
Russian gas routes. Such countries as Belarus, Ukraine, the Baltic States and Poland 
are afraid, on the one hand, of the possibility to be inside the Russian gas ring, and for 
another hand, of the growing combined influence of Russia and western European 
states in the region. Both these reasons are supposed by a number of politicians and 
researchers to lead to the increasing political and economic dependence from the RF 
and its partners in the pipeline projects. There are, for example, such fears as: the 
rising possible pressure through the price of the natural gas, the loss of the budget 
revenues for gas transit, the growing clash between Western and Eastern and Central 
European states’ interests. At the same time, it is clear that discontented states do not 
have any visible opportunities to create obstacles to the plans of Russia and, for 
instance, Germany: Western European states are ready to do all the possible in order 
to secure supplies of the Russian natural gas for their states’ needs and Russia is not 
interested at the moment in the change of its politics towards the dependent transit – 
states. Nevertheless, it cannot be claimed that Russia will not desire in the nearest 
future to improve its gas relationships with the mistrustful transit - states. If Russia 
realize that there is some threat for its interests as natural gas supplier (as, for 
instance, discovered deposits of competitive shale gas in Poland) or there is some 
opportunity to gain additional advantages (as, for example, the chance of the Russian 
Black Sea Fleet to use facilities in Ukraine for much more longer period) it will not be 
mistaken to suggest, that the RF will attempt some moves toward the transit – states. 
          Finally, after the analysis of the current foreign and security policies of the RF, 
I am not agree with the statement that the state is aiming to employ the “gas top” in 
every single occasion. Although it is true and evident that Russia is trying to gain the 
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considerable geopolitical power and weight in Europe with the help of its energy 
resources, I still think that the RF is clearly understands that often manipulations with 
the gas lever will be reflected not only in the considerable decrease of the budget 
revenues, since the state exports the significant amounts of natural gas and receives 
the substantial amounts of takings. What is more, Russia realizes that the regular 
“use” of the “gas tap” will not be favorable to the future economic and political 
relations between Russia and European countries since the RF is pretending to receive 
the status of the reliable partner not only in natural gas exporting but also in other 
spheres as well.
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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
          Energy issues are of growing interest in the modern world. Ever since the 
Industrial Revolution and until the present century, energy and the need to secure its 
supply have been fundamental to any position of power in the world. At the same 
time, despite the rising role of energy in influencing state’s national security, regime 
development, domestic and international politics, it is a fact that the professional 
journals in political science and international relations have not paid the sufficient 
attention to publishing research on these topics; themes, which have been examined in 
this respect, have been mostly devoted to research to the impact of oil. In contrast, this 
thesis focuses on the analysis of the relationship between international politics and 
natural gas originated from the Russian Federation as the country, which is widely 
recognized to be as one of the most influential actors on the energy source markets. 
This research project is based on a wide review of relevant literature supplemented by 
the data analyzing method, method of comparative analysis and the case study 
method. The latter is founded upon the examination of the new projects promoted by 
Russia, namely: the Nord Stream and South Stream pipeline projects. The findings 
underline that realist and neorealist categories have shaped foreign and security 
policies of the Russian Federation and that energy sources are seen as one of the most 
influential levers in the foreign policy implementation and as a tool for security goal 
realizations. The main conclusions to be drawn from this study that Russia despite its 
desire to gain the considerable geopolitical power and weight in Europe with the help 
of its natural gas resources cannot be blamed in aspirations to employ the “gas top” in 
every single occasion. 
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Figure 1. World Proved Natural Gas Reserves at end 2008 (in per cents). 
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Figure 2. World Proved Natural Gas Reserves at end 2008 (in trillion cubic metres). 
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Table 1. Key Natural Gas Producers in 2008 (in billion cubic meters/per cents). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: British Petroleum. 
 
Table 2. Key Natural Gas Consumers in 2008 (in billion cubic meters/per cents). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: British Petroleum. 
 
 
 
 
Country
 
Billion cubic meters Share of total 
The Russian Federation 601,7 19,6 
The United States 582,2 19,3 
Canada 175,2 5,7 
Iran 116,3 3,8 
Norway 99,2 3,2 
Algeria 86,5 2,8 
Saudi Arabia 78,1 2,5 
Qatar 76,6 2,5 
China 76,1 2,5 
Indonesia 69,7 2,3 
The United Kingdom 69,6 2,3 
The Netherlands 67,5 2,2 
Total World 3 065,6 100,0 
Country
 
Billion cubic meters Share of total 
The United States 657,2 22,0 
The Russian Federation 420,2 13,9 
Iran 117,6 3,9 
Canada 100,0 3,3 
The United Kingdom 93,9 3,1 
Japan 93,7 3,1 
Germany 82,0 2,7 
China 80,7 2,7 
Saudi Arabia 78,1 2,6 
Italy 77,7 2,6 
Mexico 67,2 2,2 
Total World 3 018,7 100,0 
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Table 3. Export movements by pipeline in 2008 (in billion cubic metres/per cents). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: British Petroleum, own calculations.  
 
Figure 3. Key Natural Gas Exporters in 2008 (in per cents). 
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Source: British Petroleum; own calculations. 
Region/Country
 
Billion cubic meters Share of total 
Canada 103,20 17,57 
Total North America 130,59 22,24 
Bolivia 11,79 2,01 
Total South and Central America 13,58 2,31 
The Netherlands 55,00 9,37 
Norway 92,78 15,80 
The Russian Federation 154,41 26,29 
Total Europe and Eurasia 349,94 59,59 
Qatar 17,10 2,91 
Total Middle East 22,90 3,90 
Algeria 37,50 6,39 
Total Africa 53,43 9,10 
Myanmar 8,55 1,46 
Total Asia Pacific 16,82 2,86 
Total World 587,26 100,00 
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Table 4. Import movements by pipeline in 2008 (in billion cubic metres/per cents). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: British Petroleum; own calculations. 
 
Figure 4. Key Natural Gas Importers in 2008 (in per cents). 
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Source: British Petroleum; own calculations. 
Region/Country
 
Billion cubic meters Share of total 
Canada 104,41 17,78 
Total North America 130,59 22,24 
Brazil 11,03 1,88 
Total South and Central America 13,58 2,31 
France 36,66 6,24 
Germany 87,10 14,83 
Italy 75,31 12,82 
Turkey 32,30 5,50 
The United Kingdom 35,42 6,03 
Total Europe and Eurasia 394,46 67,17 
The United Arab Emirates 15,40 2,62 
Total Middle East 26,86 4,57 
Tunisia 1,25 0,21 
Total Africa 4,95 0,84 
Thailand 8,55 1,46 
Singapore 8,27 1,41 
Total Asia Pacific 16,82 2,86 
Total World 587,26 100,00 
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Figure 5. World Proved Natural Gas Reserves in the EU, 1994 - 2008 (in tcm). 
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year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
tcm 3,87 3,85 3,81 3,85 3,77 4,21 4,03 3,83 3,62 3,39 3,22 3,12 2,94 2,91 2,87 
 
Source: British Petroleum. 
 
 
Figure 6. Natural Gas Production in the EU, 1994 - 2008 (in bcm). 
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year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
bcm 205,0 212,1 235,4 225,3 223,4 226,6 232,0 232,9 227,7 223,6 227,4 211,9 201,3 187,5 190,3 
 
Source: British Petroleum. 
 
 
 
Figures and Tables 
 93 
Figure 7. Natural Gas Consumption in the EU, 1994 - 2008 (in bcm). 
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year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
bcm 344,5 371,2 409,0 401,4 414,3 428,6 440,1 450,8 451,5 471,6 485,0 495,5 488,9 480,9 490,1 
 
Source: British Petroleum. 
 
 
Figure 8. Natural Gas Balance in the EU, 1994 - 2008 (in bcm). 
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Source: British Petroleum. 
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Table 5a. Imported Natural Gas Dependence in the EU, 2006 (in per cents)154. 
 
State Natural Gas 
Dependency 
Dependency 
from the 
Russian Gas 
State Natural Gas 
Dependency 
Dependency 
from the 
Russian Gas 
Austria 90,00 78,47 Latvia 110,00 100,00 
Belgium 100,00 3,43 Lithuania 100,00 100,00 
Bulgaria 90,00 100,00 Luxembourg no data --- 
Cyprus no imports --- Malta no imports --- 
Czech Rep. 110,00 75,21 Netherlands -60,00 16,02 
Denmark -100,00 0,00 Poland 70,00 66,23 
Estonia 100,00 100,00 Portugal 100,00 0,00 
Finland 100,00 100,00 Romania 30,00 63,20 
France 100,00 26,61 Slovakia 100,00 100,00 
Germany 80,00 40,22 Slovenia 100,00 50,91 
Greece 100,00 100,00 Spain 100,00 0,00 
Hungary 80,00 75,98 Sweden 100,00 0,00 
Ireland 80,00 0,00 United Kingd. 10,00 0,00 
Italy 90,00 31,96    
 
Source: European Commission Energy and Eni S. p. A.; own calculations. 
 
Table 5b. Degree of Natural Gas Dependency 
 
0 – 20 % Independent state 
20 – 40 % less independent state 
40 – 60 % state with medium dependency 
60 – 80 % highly dependent state 
80 – 100 % fully dependent state 
 
                                                 
154
 Import dependency is understood as net imports of a country divided by the sum of the gross inland 
consumption and bunkers of natural gas carrier. Gross inland consumption covers consumption by the natural 
gas branch itself, distribution and transformation losses, and final non – energy and energy consumption. A 
negative dependency rate indicates a net exporter of natural gas. A dependency rate in excess of 100 per cents 
indicates that natural gas has been stored (definitions were taken from: “Europe in Figures. Eurostat Yearbook 
2009” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 05 Apr., 2010, 
<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-CD-09-001/EN/KS-CD-09-001-EN.PDF>). 
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Figure 9.  Russia’s Proved Natural Gas Reserves, 1994 - 2008 (in bcm). 
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year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
tcm n/a n/a n/a 43,82 43,51 42,44 42,26 42,35 42,53 43,44 43,26 43,28 43,27 43,32 43,30 
 
Source: British Petroleum. 
 
 
Figure 10. Russia’s Natural Gas Production, Consumption, Export Volumes, 1994 - 2008 (in 
bcm). 
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 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
prod. 549,4 538,8 544,3 516,7 534,8 534,6 528,7 526,2 538,8 561,4 573,3 580,1 593,8 592,0 601,7 
cons. 401,5 407,6 418,2 404,8 403,6 403,6 366,5 368,6 339,9 353,8 352,8 366,0 361,5 377,3 381,2 
exp.vol. 148,0 131,2 126,1 111,9 131,2 131,2 162,2 157,7 198,9 207,5 220,5 214,1 232,3 214,7 220,5 
 
 
Source: British Petroleum; own calculations. 
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Figure 11. Natural Gas Transmission Networks in Russia, the CIS and Europe. 
 
 
 
Source: Gazprom.
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Figure 12. Turkmenistan’s Proved Natural Gas Reserves, 1994 - 2008 (in bcm). 
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year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
tcm n/a n/a n/a 2,62 2,51 2,43 2,43 2,43 2,43 2,43 2,43 2,43 2,43 2,43 7,94 
 
Source: British Petroleum. 
 
Figure 13. Turkmenistan’s Natural Gas Production, Consumption, Export Volumes, 1994 - 
2008 (in bcm). 
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 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
prod. 32,3 29,2 31,9 15,7 12,0 20,6 42,5 46,4 48,4 53,5 52,8 57,0 60,4 65,4 66,1 
cons. 9,9 7,8 9,7 9,8 10,0 11,0 12,2 12,5 12,9 14,2 15,0 16,1 18,4 21,3 19,0 
exp.vol. 22,4 21,4 22,2 5,9 2,1 9,7 30,3 33,9 35,6 39,3 37,7 40,9 42,0 44,2 47,1 
 
Source: British Petroleum; own calculations. 
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Figure 14. Azerbaijan’s Natural Gas Proved Reserves, 1994 - 2008 (in bcm). 
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year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
tcm n/a n/a n/a 0,81 0,81 1,24 1,24 1,24 1,24 1,24 1,24 1,22 1,22 1,16 1,20 
 
Source: British Petroleum. 
 
Figure 15. Azerbaijan’s Natural Gas Production, Consumption, Export Volumes, 1994 - 2008 
(in bcm). 
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 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
prod. 5,8 6,0 5,7 5,4 5,1 5,4 5,1 5,0 4,7 4,6 4,5 5,2 6,1 9,8 14,7 
cons. 15,0 15,3 14,7 11,4 8,4 7,9 7,8 5,7 5,4 5,1 5,4 5,2 7,5 7,5 7,7 
exp.vol. -9,2 -9,3 -9,0 -6,0 -3,3 -2,4 -2,7 -0,7 -0,0 -0,4 -0,9 -0,1 -1,4 2,3 7,0 
 
Source: British Petroleum; own calculations. 
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                    Figure 16. Nord Stream. The Planned Pipeline Route. 
 
                     
 
 
         Source: Nord Stream A. G.
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         Figure 17. Major Pipelines from Russia. 
 
 
 
         Source: East European Gas Analysis. 
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Table 6. Russian Natural Gas Export to Europe: Annual and Daily January Streams – Forecast 
for 2020 (in bcm)155. 
Export Routes Ukraine Belarus and 
Poland 
Ukraine Belarus and 
Poland 
Annual Streams [1] [2] [1] [2] 
Ukraine 83.000,00 118.000,00 53.000,00 88.000,00 
Belarus 35.000,00 -- 35.000,00 -- 
Finland 6.000,00 6.000,00 6.000,00 6.000,00 
Blue Stream 16.000,00 16.000,00 16.000,00 16.000,00 
Nord Stream 55.000,00 55.000,00 55.000,00 55.000,00 
South Stream 30.000,00 30.000,00 30.000,00 30.000,00 
∑ 225.000,00 225.000,00 195.000,00 195.000,00 
Daily Streams [1] [2] [1] [2] 
Ukraine 300,00 428,00 200,00 328,00 
Belarus 128,00 -- 128,00 0,00 
Finland 18,00 18,00 18,00 18,00 
Blue Stream 53,00 53,00 53,00 53,00 
Nord Stream 176,00 176,00 176,00 176,00 
South Stream 105,00 105,00 105,00 105,00 
∑ 780,00 780,00 680,00 680,00 
Ukrainian Consumption* 310,00 310,00 310,00 310,00 
Transit through Ukraine 300,00 428,00 200,00 328,00 
Extraction in Ukraine -59,00 -59,00 -59,00 -59,00 
Gas from Ukrainian UGS 
Facilities 
-220,00 -158,00 -220,00 -58,00 
Balance 331,00 521,00 231,00 521,00 
Deliveries from Russia** 310,00 521,00 207,00 521,00 
Illegally Gas Takings by 
Ukraine 
21,00 -- 24,00 -- 
Source: East European Gas Analysis.
                                                 
155
 The variant of conflict between Russia and Ukraine with following minimisation of natural gas transit was 
foreseen in the column “Ukraine”; the variant of conflict between Russia and Belarus and/or Poland with the 
following minimisation of natural gas transit through these countries was foreseen in the column “Belarus and 
Poland”.  [1] – variant of the maximum export to Europe and Turkey; [2] – realistic variant. * - the average 
natural gas consumption for the last 10 years; ** - including fuel gas of compressor stations for transit to Europe 
(in the variant of conflict between Russia and Ukraine). 
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            Table 18. South Stream. The Planned Pipeline Offshore Route. 
 
                                  
 
 
              Source: East European Gas Analysis. 
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Table 19. Competing Gas Pipeline Import Routes from Caspian Region and Middle East into Southern Europe. 
 
 
                        
 
                      Source: IntelliBriefs. 
